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The history of international capital markets is replete with cycles of credit booms and crashes 
(Kindleberger, 1978; Galbraith, 1975). Latin America has often been an active player in the 
checkered performance of these markets; indeed, the region's access to international credit was 
ended by defaults in the late 1820s, late 1880s, the 1890s, and the early 1930s (ECLAC, 1965). 
The latest crisis of course broke out in August 1982 when a serious debt servicing problem in 
Mexico —then the world's second largest developing-country debtor— sparked a systemic 
financial collapse in Latin America, the negative repercussions of which are still being felt today 
(ECLAC, 1990b). 
The problems of the 1980s in many ways followed the traditional pattern of financial 
crisis: euphoric borrowing and lending followed by payment difficulties, defaults and moratoria. 
However, the period also was characterized by a major novelty: the emergence of an 
international-lender-of-last-resort (ILLR), which helped to delay many formal defaults and 
moratoria, thereby allowing creditors to evade the destabilizing losses that normally have 
accompanied systemic financial crises.1 
The action of the ILLR - i n this case led by the United States Government- worked quite 
effectively in the early 1980s in avoiding the formal defaults that could have toppled major 
international commercial banks and played havoc with world output.2 The precise mechanisms 
deployed by the ILLR are relatively well known. First, the commercial banks —the region's main 
creditor- grouped together behind their Advisory Committee of lead banks to reschedule debt 
service through principal restructuring and partial refinance of interest payments (termed 
"involuntary lending"). Moreover, the terms of the reschedulings were commercial, indeed more 
correctly punitive, in nature.3 Second, bilateral debt was rescheduled through the Paris Club. 
Third, new lending was mobilized from the multilateral agencies to partially refinance scheduled 
debt service. Fourth, the debt reschedulings and new money packages were cross-conditioned 
by the signing of a standby agreement with the IMF; the Fund's adjustment programme in turn 
deflated the debtors' economies and produced a large trade surplus for the service of interest 
payments. Finally, the United States Treasury and the Bank for International Settlements 
organized short-term bridge loans which provided the interim refinancing needed to avoid formal 
defaults during the complex debt restructuring negotiations.4 
The coordination of the banks and other creditors was relatively tight, indeed cartel-like. 
As an instrument to save the international financial system, the ILLR worked quite well. The 
rescheduling/refinancing of debt service on rather lucrative commercial terms, coupled with 
draconian adjustment measures in the debtor countries, helped the banks to avoid losses; indeed, 
Latin America ironically became a profit centre for these institutions during their worst financial 
crisis since the 1930s.5 
The initial reschedulings of 1982/1983 incorporated practically all the debtor countries 
of the region. However, in four subsequent rounds of reschedulings in the period 1983-1990 
progressively fewer countries participated in the official debt management program.6 The other 
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side of the coin of this growing rate of attrition was the accumulation of arrears in the service 
of foreign debt. The arrears build-up in the region, on interest payments alone, exceeded US$ 
25 billion by the end of 1990, and accounted for 20% of the debt accumulated since 1981 (see 
tables 1 and 2). At least US$ 21 billion of the unpaid interest was with the commercial banks; 
the rest affected government creditors and multilateral lenders. In 1990 the only countries fully 
current on their debt service for the entire year were Chile, Mexico, Colombia and Uruguay.7 
The build-up of arrears effectively represented the emergence of a quiet moratorium8 in 
Latin America. In contrast with the 1930s, when the stoppage of payments by major debtors was 
relatively sudden and massive,9 the defaults of the 1980s have emerged gradually and parallel 
with the official debt rescue program's increasing inability to adapt itself to the deteriorating 
situation of most of the debtor countries. Moreover, defaults were staved off long enough to 
allow the banks to build defenses through the provision of loan loss reserves and increases in 
their capital base. Consequently, although sometimes troublesome, the arrears in the region have 
not been life threatening to the financial system or to most individual lenders. 
Even though most countries in Latin America have fallen into some type of moratorium, 
there has been relatively little study of the phenomenon. This is perhaps due to the great stigma 
that financial circles attach to a moratorium and the fact that the payments restrictions have 
emerged gradually, mostly with little fanfare, and with little threat to Northern financial systems. 
This paper overviews the issue of moratorium in the region, with a view to arriving at some 
tentative general conclusions about the "why" and "how" of the payments restrictions and their 
impact on economic adjustment and the renegotiation of the external debt. 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF DEBT MORATORIA IN LATIN AMERICA 
The shock of Mexico's debt service problems in 1982 rippled through the financial system and 
caused a dramatic restriction of private credit. This, coupled with falling prices for exports and 
high real interest rates, induced practically all the Latin American countries to seek debt relief 
from their creditors. The most notable exception was Colombia, which had gained a reputation 
for extremely cautious debt management; its relatively benign debt profile allowed it to escape 
the wave of reschedulings.10 
What is striking about 1982 is that with the explosion of the worst financial crisis since 
the 1930s there was no major outbreak of interest arrears in Latin America (see tables 1 and 
2).11 This was largely due to the comprehensiveness of the actions taken by the ILLR. Indeed, 
the only principal sources of a serious accumulation of arrears in 1982 -Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
and Bolivia--12 actually were manifestations of debt-servicing problems that had emerged with 
the banks and the Paris Club countries prior to the great financial crisis. Moreover, the ILLR 
brought Costa Rica into the first round of reschedulings and thereby helped it reduce its arrears 
to nearly zero in 1983. 
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There was a bulge in arrears in late 1983, largely due to events in Argentina —the third 
biggest developing-country debtor (see again table 1). A military government had negotiated a 
rescheduling agreement in principle during the first round of these exercises. However, 
implementation became blocked by a failure to comply with IMF targets -which, in turn, 
paralyzed the disbursement of involuntary loans— and by disagreements with the banks over 
details of the restructuring agreement itself (Bouzas and Keifman, 1988). A rapid drain of 
international reserves induced arrears with the banks in October 1983. Resolution of the problem 
was left to the new democratic government of Raul Alfonsin, which entered power in December 
of that year. 
The new authorities decided not to accept the onerous rescheduling agreement negotiated 
with the banks by the former military regime; indeed they attempted to change the prevailing 
rules of the game —very favourable to the bank cartel— through a "radicalization" of the debt 
negotiations (Bouzas and Keifman, 1988) . A continued accumulation of arrears with the banks 
emerged as part of the bargaining for a better deal. The Argentine Government was also 
instrumental in the formation, in early 1984, of a group of Latin American debtors —dubbed the 
Cartagena Consensus- which attempted to construct a regional position on some of the major 
issues surrounding the debt crisis.13 Finally, the country even presented a unilaterally 
formulated adjustment programme to the IMF (Machinea and Sommer, 1992). 
The Argentine negotiations were the first serious public challenge to the difficult terms 
imposed by the banks and the ILLR in the first two rounds of reschedulings.14 But heavy 
pressure from the banks and the ILLR, coupled with a deteriorating domestic economic 
programme and the limited disposition of other major debtors to follow Argentina's tougher 
bargaining position, caused the struggle to gradually peter out and formally end in late 1984 
when the country joined the rest of the region in signing on to the third round of debt 
restructuring accords. The new terms offered Argentina were somewhat more generous than 
those agreed to in the first round of reschedulings and also established a way to begin 
eliminating the country's serious accumulation of interest arrears (see table 2). However, the 
terms of the new rescheduling accord were merely in line with the pattern established by Mexico 
at mid-year in its new accord with the banks, which emerged only after very difficult 
negotiations.15 The concessions granted Mexico and other debtors helped to isolate the 
recalcitrant Argentine authorities, as well as to forestall any possibility of the Cartagena 
Consensus evolving into a debtors'cartel (Devlin, 1989). 
Although much of the creditors' efforts in 1984 were concentrated on avoiding a 
protracted default in megadebtor Argentina, problems were emerging for some of the smaller 
countries of the region. During the first half of 1984 the Belaunde government in Peru failed 
to comply with its IMF targets, which paralyzed new disbursements from that organization and 
the banks. That in turn induced the beginning of a quiet moratorium in a country which 
heretofore had been one of the most cooperative debtors in the region. By the end of the year 
the government had accumulated interest arrears which accounted for 13% of the growth in 
outstanding debt (see table 2). 
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Meanwhile, Bolivia formalized its moratorium on the service of debt to the commercial 
banks and the Paris Club countries. After a major rescheduling with the banks in 1981, the 
country had begun once again to fall behind in its payments in late 1982. An interim agreement 
with the banks to normalize payments avoided a moratorium. However, in the last quarter of 
1983 the country failed to make a payment. This was followed by another interim agreement 
to reestablish payments in 1984. However, the collapse of the tin market eroded whatever 
capacity to pay that was left; in May the banks were informed by telex that the country was not 
able to make even partial payments. Then in June the Siles Zuazo government, in a political 
pact with Bolivia's powerful labor union, announced its intention to limit debt service to 25% 
of exports (Cariaga, 1992). It also joined Argentina in pushing for concerted regional action on 
the debt through the Cartagena Consensus. By the end of 1984 arrears in that country accounted 
for 18% of the accumulation of debt (see table 2). 
During 1984 Costa Rica once again experienced troubles with the IMF and its debt 
service. However, the signing of new accords with the Fund and other creditors during the third 
round of reschedulings once again allowed it to regularize payments. 
New rescheduling agreements also gave the Dominican Republic an opportunity to 
regularize payments. On the other hand, even though Honduras had reached a rescheduling 
agreement in principle with the banks, it continued to fall behind in payments because of 
problems with the IMF. Meanwhile, Paraguay's payment problems with certain Paris Club 
countries, originally considered temporary in nature, began to take on a more permanent 
character. And, of course, there was little hope of war-torn Nicaragua reversing its steady 
accumulation of arrears to nearly all creditors (see table 1). 
The success of the third round of rescheduling in containing arrears, coupled with the 
strong growth of the United States economy in 1984, led some to conclude by early 1985 that 
the debt problem was over (Hector, 1985). The problem fronts that remained were in a few 
smaller countries like Bolivia, Nicaragua and Peru. Moreover, the most important of these ~ 
Peru— was expected to regularize its payments after the inauguration of a new government in 
mid-year. However, serious problems developed as the year progressed. 
The continuing weight of the debt began to stir unrest in Mexico and Brazil; this latter 
country even began to withhold payments to the Paris Club countries.16 In addition, Cuba 
started a highly publicized campaign in which it argued that the region's debt was unpayable and 
should be forgiven. Meanwhile, in Peru the leading presidential candidate made the IMF and the 
excessive burden of the debt the central issues in his political campaign. Moreover, one of his 
first acts as President, after a land-slide victory, was to formalize and radicalize Peru's 
moratorium by announcing that the country would not go to the IMF and would also limit public 
debt service to 10% of exports. 
The tension that grew out of these events probably explains the surprise (and improvised) 
announcement of the Baker Plan in September 1985 (Devlin, 1989). The Plan addressed the 
debtor countries' concern about the stagnation of their economies and the ever tighter 
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environment for fresh credit. In effect, the new focus promised adjustment with growth. To 
achieve this the United States Treasury Secretary pledged to revitalize involuntary lending 
—which had fallen off sharply in the third round of rescheduling— for 17 countries, most of 
which were Latin American.17 
The Baker Plan was clearly a bold attempt to put new life into the flagging international 
debt strategy and to prevent other Latin American countries from following Peru's bad example. 
In this regard, the strategy initially worked to some extent: anticipation of the benefits of the 
new Plan helped to calm the debate around the debt issue. However, the Baker Plan in fact 
marked the beginning of a serious breakdown in the official management of the debt problem. 
The Plan had a difficult take-off. By late 1985 many banks had discarded the possibility 
of a quick economic turnaround in the region and they also were in a better position to absorb 
delays in payments; the banks therefore strongly resisted the new involuntary lending proposed 
by Mr. Baker. Indeed, the Plan's pilot rescheduling in Mexico came about only in mid-1986 
after a very serious threat of a moratorium in that country and the direct intervention of the 
Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve, who literally "informed" the banks of their 
participation in a US$ 13.7 billion concerted financing package for that country. 
The banks, severely irritated by the government's intervention in their affairs, stated that 
the softer commercial terms and new money granted Mexico constituted a special case.18 
Negotiations in other countries, all of which were asking for the "Mexican treatment", stalled. 
The stalemate contributed to the growth of moratoria in the region. 
The inability to arrange an appropriate rescheduling/new money package caused Costa 
Rica to once again fall into a de facto moratorium, first in late 1985 with certain Paris Club 
countries and then with the commercial banks in 1986. Meanwhile, the marked drop in 
petroleum prices in late 1985 had put severe pressure on Ecuador's finances. The Febres 
Cordero government was a favored target for the Baker Plan. However, the failure to organize 
a serious new money package for this country aggravated its payment problems with the banks 
and creditor governments; by the beginning of 1987 there was a serious problem of arrears. A 
strong earthquake in March 1987, which damaged the country's trans-Andean oil pipeline, 
turned the lag in payments into a formal suspension of debt service. In 1986 the Dominican 
Republic again slid into arrears with the Paris Club governments. Cuba also added itself to the 
list of countries in moratorium with the banks and creditor governments, while Paraguay, 
already in arrears with certain governments, started to fall behind in payments to the commercial 
banks as well. On the other hand, in mid-1986 Bolivia started to climb out of its moratorium by 
negotiating a rescheduling with the Paris Club governments that included a regularization of 
arrears. Debt with the banks, however, remained unserviced. 
A major blow for the prevailing debt strategy grew out of developments in Brazil. The 
Sarney administration —which had built up interest arrears with the Paris Club between January 
1985 and April 1986- saw its external situation eroded by a severe narrowing of the country's 
trade surplus in late 1986 due to the excessive domestic demand generated by its Cruzado Plan. 
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The new economic team was skeptical of the Baker Plan and wanted to redefine the rules of the 
debt rescheduling game. In January 1987, it settled -thanks to the favourable intervention of 
the United States Secretary of the Treasury Baker- a long dispute with the Paris Club over the 
IMF and rescheduled without a prior standby agreement with the Fund. However, in February 
1987 the government made a surprise declaration of a moratorium on the servicing of bank debt. 
The above developments in the period 1986-1987 caused a sharp rise in the region's 
interest arrears. The vast majority of countries (including Cuba) were behind in their debt 
service payments (see table 1). The figures might have been considerably worse if the 
announcement of the Brazilian moratorium had not jolted the banks into action: to avoid copy 
cats they largely reversed themselves in the negotiations and fired off a rapid set of 
reschedulings in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
The bulge in arrears in 1987 —and the Brazilian moratorium in particular—, coupled with 
competitive considerations, encouraged the banks to sharply increase their loan loss reserves. 
The trend was led by Citicorp, which in May 1987 announced that it would increase its reserves 
by 150%. The reserving, moreover, induced the first generalized report of losses for the banking 
industry since the Great Depression.19 But, significantly, these were controlled losses that 
improved the bargaining position of the banks and signaled their ability to weather the threats 
of moratorium.20 
Shifting domestic politics and a deteriorating economic programme contributed to the 
Brazilian moratorium's loss of momentum in the last quarter of the year. Thus, even though 
arrears had formally reached record levels by the end of 1987, a preliminary accord with the 
banks in December in fact opened up prospects of a more regular debt servicing picture in 
1988. 
Indeed, 1988 started out with some improvement for the creditors. At the beginning of 
the year, Bolivia —using donor funds- organized a buyback of one half of its bank debt at 11 
cents on the dollar. Nevertheless, arrears remained outstanding for those banks that refused to 
accept the country's buy-back offer. In June, Brazil also signed a global restructuring accord 
with the banks. 
However, in Argentina a deteriorating balance of payments and delayed disbursement of 
loans from the banks and the IMF (due to problems with conditionality) had created a rather 
precarious payments position with all creditors during the latter half of 1987. Stop-gap measures 
—including some emergency bridge loans— avoided a de facto moratorium. Nevertheless, the 
lack of adequate and predictable external financing made the payments situation unsustainable; 
in April the country began a de facto moratorium on the service of bank debt and certain 
bilateral obligations. The arrears with the Paris Club governments were largely cleared by a 
rescheduling at the end of 1989; meanwhile arrears continued to accumulate with the banks and 
reached US$ 7 billion at the end of 1990 (see Annex, table Al). A new problem front also 
opened up in Panama where domestic political strife eroded an already precarious payments 
position. Indeed, by 1988 this country had initiated a de facto moratorium that affected nearly 
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all credits and would continue into the 1990s. In sum, in contrast to expectations, the arrears 
picture did not improve in 1988 as regulanzations in some countries were offset by problems 
in other countries (see tables 1 and 2). 
The year 1989 began with the announcement of yet another debt strategy —the Brady 
Plan. The scheme promised concerted public financial and institutional support for voluntary 
reduction of bank debt.21 But, significantly for our purposes, it also introduced a new and more 
flexible official stance on arrears with the banks. As already mentioned, the official management 
programme had cross- conditioned the debtor country's agreements with the IMF and the banks. 
However, the Brady Plan established new rules of the game which in principle made it possible, 
on a-case-by-case basis, to delink an IMF programme and other official lending from a prior 
debt agreement with the banks. Indeed, the new scheme permitted a temporary official 
toleration of arrears in cases where countries were willing to negotiate an adjustment programme 
with the Fund. This strategy in fact represented the generalization of a policy which had been 
quietly experimented with in Bolivia and Costa Rica, two countries in moratorium with the banks 
since 1984 and 1986, respectively. 
The new policy gained immediate expression. In early 1989 Mexico —current on its debt 
service— initiated an adjustment programme with the IMF and a rescheduling with the Paris Club 
before reaching an agreement with the banks later in the year for a Brady-style debt 
reduction.22 That same year Ecuador and Argentina signed agreements with the Fund even 
while they were in serious arrears with the banks. Both countries did, however, agree to 
partially service their bank debt: Argentina pledged US$ 40 million per month and Ecuador US$ 
13 million, equivalent to about one-third of scheduled service. They also regularized their arrears 
with the Paris Club governments through new rescheduling accords. Meanwhile, Costa Rica and 
Bolivia continued to have an official umbrella over their protracted arrears with the banks while 
the former negotiated a Brady package and the latter organized a donor-financed buy-back of 
another quarter of its bank debt (at 11 cents on the dollar). Finally, towards the end of the year 
Brazil quietly fell into a de facto moratorium with the banks. The Dominican Republic did the 
same. 
Although the arrears problem in the region affected all types of creditors, about three 
quarters of the unpaid obligations were with commercial banks. After their unpleasant experience 
with the IMF in the Mexican negotiations, the banks decided to go on the offensive against the 
new official policy, which delinked official loans from the problem of arrears with the 
commercial lenders. Indeed, in May 1990 commercial lenders sponsored an important report 
which literally pronounced that "arrears are not the way" (Institute for International Finance, 
1990). The commercial lenders increased the pressure during the rest of 1990 as considerable 
arrears were built up in Brazil and the new Collor government hardened its bargaining position 
on the foreign debt. 
While interest arrears rapidly accumulated in Brazil —reaching nearly 10 billion 
by the end of 1990— other countries advanced in their negotiations. Costa Rica finalized a Brady 
debt reduction accord which included a rescheduling of all arrears. Venezuela, which at the 
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beginning the year had been accumulating arrears under an IMF umbrella, also negotiated a debt 
reduction accord with the banks. Another accord was implemented in Uruguay (current on its 
debt service), while Chile (also current) chose to reschedule its bank debt.23 Meanwhile, 
Argentina increased its debt service to the banks to US$ 60 million per month. 
At the same time new mechanisms also were introduced to deal with arrears with 
multilateral lenders. A governmental consultative group provided bridge loans to Honduras to 
help it eliminate arrears with these lenders and negotiations were initiated to form official 
support groups with similar goals for Peru and Nicaragua. Peru moreover renewed its debt 
service to the multilateral lenders, which at least froze its interest arrears to these institutions 
at about US$ 500 million. Later in 1991 Nicaragua and Peru would reach agreements with their 
respective support groups and the two countries would also regularize themselves with the Paris 
Club (O'Connell, 1992). 
By the end of 1990 it also had become clear that the pressure being applied by the banks 
was having some effect. Brazil found that its arrears with the commercial lenders were 
contributing to problems in signing an IMF agreement. Moreover, the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) began to condition their loans to the reaching of an 
agreement with the banks over accumulated arrears. The official pressure was a factor in Brazil's 
arriving at an agreement with the banks in early 1991. In effect, Brazil agreed to pay in cash 
US$2 billion of interest arrears accumulated up through 1990 and convert the balance (US$ 6 
billion) into 10-year bonds when the country managed to formalize a Brady accord, perhaps in 
1992 (de Freitas, 1992). These events in Brazil —which relinked official lending to a prior 
agreement with the banks— signaled a reversal in perhaps the most innovative feature of the 
Brady Plan. 
Looked at from another angle, the pragmatic gray zone for payments established by the 
Brady Plan became threatened by the more black-and-white perspective of the banks. As the 
Director of the Institute of International Finance, an organization of the banking community, 
recently stated: "The system cannot work, however, for those countries that choose to disregard 
its rules.... There is only one standard: either you fulfill your contractual obligations or you 
don't." CLDC Debt Report. 1991). 
III. THE STRUCTURAL BACKGROUND OF LATIN AMERICAN MORATORIA 
The debt crisis that spread over Latin America in the beginning of the 1980s was one of the 
special features of the worldwide recession of 1980-1983. However, even though the world 
economy recovered from that setback, the debt problem of Latin American countries lingered 
on. Moreover, as just shown, in their muddling through this problem, most of the countries 
entered into either formal or de facto moratoria on the service of their external debt. Our 
contention is that these payments problems, as well as the heavy indebtedness of the previous 
decade, must be read against the background of structural imbalances which have characterized, 
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in each national case, the development of Latin American economies and which also have been 
aggravated by the crisis itself. 
Krueger (1987) points out that the explanations of what went wrong in the early 1980s 
can be divided into the following groups: those focusing on the unsustainability of the debt 
build-up in the 1970s (thereby implicitly blaming the policies of the debtor countries); those 
pointing to the unexpected changes in the world economy in the early 1980s; and those centering 
on developing countries' unwillingness or inability to adjust to the "harsher economic realities 
of the 1980s". 
We agree with this characterization, as well as with Krueger's stance that the important 
question is how much weight should be attached to each of these factors. However, we add an 
important caveat: the blaming of domestic policies -both for their role in building up an 
unsustainable debt and in the eventual inability to adjust— should be understood in the context 
of the persistence of structural imbalances; the deficiencies of many of the conditions imposed 
by multilateral lenders; the extreme shortsightedness of creditor banks; and the domestic 
political constraints on the adoption of quick and effective economic policies. In other words, 
instead of thinking of a rather ethereal economic policy in which failure or success in solving 
economic imbalances is to be absolutely blamed or praised on technical grounds, we conceive 
economic policy responses as taking place not only amid structural —and, hence, hard to solve— 
imbalances, but also in the context of institutionally conditioned policy regimes in which reform 
itself is eventually part of the needed structural changes. Moreover this reform and its costs 
confront an array of political interests supporting or opposing each policy measure. 
Thus, our view is that the debt build-up essentially originated in the structural tendencies 
of most Latin American economies to accommodate external, saving and fiscal imbalances which 
were greatly amplified during the 1970s when a permissive international financial environment 
induced a massive expansion of liquidity. Of course, the story of the debt build-up is not a one-
sided one in which Latin American policy-makers were the innocent victims of the corrupting 
commercial banks. On the one hand, existing trade, exchange, macroeconomic and fiscal policy 
regimes in place in most countries were functional to the operation of a structurally unbalanced 
style of development (Altimir, 1990); on the other hand, policy measures more often than not 
sacrificed fundamental stability for short-term political advantage under the benign mantle of 
increasing external indebtedness. 
By the end of the 1970s a number of Latin American countries (Brazil, Bolivia, Mexico 
and Peru) had already reached very high24 debt/export ratios (see table 3), while others 
(Argentina, Chile, Uruguay) maintained their ratios at reasonable levels, but with unsatisfactory 
economic growth rates. Still others (Costa Rica, Ecuador, Venezuela) were attaining satisfactory 
GDP growth, with their debt outstanding at still relatively low levels, but with their medium-
term "solvency" at risk because their debt was growing faster than their exports.25 (See 
Krueger, 1987.) In any event, whichever was the case, most Latin American countries 
(Colombia being a noteworthy exception) faced the external unsustainability of their economic 
growth, as some analysts observed at the time (ECLAC, 1978). 
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But there was another side to the question of the sustainability of the debt build-up: the 
fiscal one. By 1980, public and publicly guaranteed debt represented more than half of the 
external debt of most Latin American countries (see table 4). On the other hand, in some cases 
public external debt was already greater than the annual amount of total fiscal revenues. 
Moreover, public debt was increasing at rates well above the rates of expansion of fiscal 
revenues, an indication of a latent fiscal "insolvency". 
Against this background, events in the international economy in 1979-1982 compounded 
the vulnerable situation of the countries of the region. The oil price increase of 1979 induced 
both a further enhancement of international liquidity and policy responses in the OECD countries 
which checked inflationary pressures mainly through the restriction of money supply. The result 
was severe worldwide recession, with real interest rates climbing to the highest levels seen in 
the post-war era. The consequent fall of commodity prices joined the increase in the price of oil 
to further depress the terms of trade of the oil-importing countries to their lowest levels since 
the 1930s. 
The attitude of commercial banks and national policy responses to these events aggravated 
the underlying situation of most Latin American countries. Some banks, overflowing with 
liquidity, tried once again to recycle their petrodollars to developing countries. Just as in the 
earlier petro-crisis of 1973/1974, most oil-importing Latin American countries interpreted their 
difficulties as a liquidity crisis, resorting to further indebtedness to overcome what was 
considered as a transitory restriction.26 Oil-exporting countries also took advantage of the 
permissive supply of credit to become further indebted, but on the contrary assumption that their 
export-price bonanza had a permanent basis. (Bianchi, Devlin and Ramos, 1987). 
By 1982 the stage was set for a major regional crisis. Most countries were already highly 
indebted (Argentina, Brazil, Costa rica, Chile and Mexico, by well beyond three times the value 
of their exports) and were burdened with interest payments exceeding the critical threshold of 
20% of their exports (in fact, they amounted to more than 40% and even 50% in the cases 
indicated above).27 On the other hand, the world recession and OECD monetary policy kept 
export growth --even of the oil-exporting countries— well below the level of nominal interest 
rates (Cline, 1984). What has been less noted, but seems nonetheless to be crucial, is the fact 
that debtor governments, responsible for at least a third and often more than half of the total 
external debt outstanding (see table 4), were already facing interest payments to the tune of 7% 
to 10%, or even 17% (Mexico and Ecuador) or 40% (Costa Rica) of their current public 
revenues (see table 5).28 Moreover, public indebtedness, fueled by mounting fiscal deficits, 
was growing faster than public revenues. 
As mentioned earlier, the financial stress in the region turned into a full-blown crisis in 
1982, when the Mexican moratorium unleashed panic across the market, and even the most 
responsible borrowers came to be viewed by bankers as still further examples of half-collapsed 
economies in a "bad neighborhood". New credit flows came to a virtual halt, and by early 
1983, with the cut-off of the rollover process, almost every Latin American debtor with 
significant exposure with the banks faced a situation of de facto default (ECLAC, 1990a). 
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As a result, the finance of Latin American development underwent a major structural 
change. The net inflow of funds suddenly reversed, as a consequence of the fact that the 
previously sustained supply of credit turned into an effective demand for repayment. Countries 
with a roll-over ratio well below one in 1980-1981, indicating that their debt service had been 
amply financed by new disbursements (Argentina, Chile or Ecuador), or around one (Bolivia, 
Brazil or Costa Rica), suffered sharp jumps in their ratios, as new finance fell far short of 
covering debt service accruals (see table 6). 
Moreover, the payment crisis had been anticipated by economic agents, causing 
unregistered net outflows of private capital; during the 1981-1982 period the outflow amounted 
to US$ 45 billion, or more than 20% of the region's exports. When, in 1983 the net credit 
transfer to the region also became negative, as a consequence of the breakdown of the rollover 
process, the countries of the region began transferring outward around US$ 30 billion annually, 
or 25% to 30% of regional exports (ECLAC, 1990a). 
During the crisis, many countries saw their international reserves dwindle to less than 
three months of imports and some (e.g. Mexico and Uruguay) to less than a month (see table 
7). 
In such a predicament, the Latin American countries' adjustment of their external 
accounts was forced and painfully swift. (Insofar as interest payments were considered 
sacrosanct, the trade balance must forcibly adjust itself.) Moreover, since export growth was 
bounded - i n the short and medium term- by productive and marketing capacities as well as 
the vagaries of world commodity markets, adjustment had to be based primarily on the 
contraction of imports and the resulting paralyzation of economic growth. 
Actually, the region as a whole produced trade surpluses of more than US$ 30 billion a 
year in the 1983-1985 period, curtailing its imports to less than US$ 60 billion, compared with 
US$ 90 billion in 1980. Many countries reduced their imports to around 80% of exports, while 
for some (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela) imports shrank to less than 
two-thirds of exports. Only Costa Rica was able to maintain its trade balance more or less even, 
while Colombia managed a gradual and sustainable adjustment (see table 8). 
Such massive external adjustment based on the compression of imports was, for some 
countries, clearly untenable in the longer run. But it was on the fiscal front —which, unlike the 
external sector, was not subject to automatic adjustment— where many of them began to 
flounder. At the outbreak of the crisis, public external debt in some countries (Argentina, 
Ecuador, Mexico and Peru) was significantly greater than current public revenues; in Costa Rica 
and Bolivia, it was 3.7 times and 7.9 times current revenues, respectively (see table 9). During 
the crisis, public external indebtedness rapidly increased, driven both by agreed capitalizations 
of interest and by the forced public assumption of a large part of the private external debt which 
had originally been contracted without a government guarantee.29 By 1985, only in Venezuela 
was public external debt roughly equivalent to fiscal revenues. In Brazil and Colombia, it was 
40% higher than revenues and most countries had a public external debt/fiscal revenues ratio 
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close to or higher than 2; in Peru, this ratio was higher than 3, and in Bolivia close to 6 (see 
table 9). 
Accrued interest on public debt outstanding climbed sharply during the crisis. In 1980 
it had represented moderate proportions of current fiscal revenues: little more than 2% in 
Argentina, between 4% and 10% in most other countries and 13% in Peru, the outlier being 
20% in Bolivia. By 1982 in some countries this proportion had doubled or tripled. In 1985 
accrued interest already amounted to 11 % of current revenues in Brazil and Colombia, between 
15 and 20% in Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico and Uruguay, 22% in Peru and 39% in 
Bolivia (see table 5).30 
Thus, interest accrued on external public debt became a major force driving public sector 
deficits. Excluding Costa Rica and Venezuela —which had fiscal surpluses--, by 1985 interest 
accruals represented at least between a half and two-thirds of the level of the countries' public 
sector deficits, and in some cases (Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile and Uruguay) had become greater 
than their shrinking public deficits (see table 10). 
Aggravating this increased burden, most Latin American states were faced between 1982 
and 1984 with the consequences of their creditors' decision to cut off the roll-over finance of 
public debt service. Brazil and Peru delayed the reversal of the flow of funds until 1985, and 
Colombia was able to maintain a favourable roll-over ratio until 1987. Chile's Government 
benefitted from a positive flow of funds during the 1982-1985 period (see table 11). 
These processes involved massive turnarounds in the net flow of resources between 
governments and their external creditors. 
Before the crisis, many governments had received a net external transfer amounting on average 
to 6%-8% of their current revenues. During the crisis years, the net transfer of external 
resources became negative for most Latin American governments, representing significant 
proportions of their revenues. This amounted to a turnaround of resources equivalent to 9% of 
current public revenues for Brazil, 12% for Ecuador and Venezuela, 14% for Argentina, 17% 
for Mexico and Uruguay, and 18% for Colombia (since 1987). On the other hand, the 
Governments of Chile and Peru bore negative net external transfers in the years just before the 
crisis, which became significantly positive in 1982/1984, only to turn negative again since 1985 
(see table 12). 
In such circumstances, fundamental macroeconomic stability, coupled with external debt 
compliance, required that the countries not only produce a trade surplus equivalent to the 
transfer of financial resources abroad, but also that the public sector obtain a parallel primary 
(that is, prior to interest payments) surplus that would allow it to secure the resources for 
financing the public transfer. As has been noted elsewhere (ECLAC, 1989), in countries where 
the public sector owns the main export industries, there is a direct connection between the 
economy's capacity to sustain a net transfer of resources abroad and the public sector's financing 
capacity: the external and fiscal balances tend to work in tandem. On the other hand, in 
countries whose main exports are owned by the private sector, even when the trade surplus may 
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provide the basis for transferring resources abroad, the debtor government has to raise 
domestically the resources to cover its greater expenditure. 
The degree of success in attaining this goal has been heavily determined by two factors: 
the fiscal situation prior to the external shocks and the repercussions of the external adjustment 
on the public budget. (Fanelli, Frenkel and Rozenwurcel, 1990). These, in turn, varied from one 
country to another, according to the degree of public indebtedness, the public balance of 
payments (structurally different, as noted above, for those governments that own exportable 
resources and for those that do not), and the degree to which creditors maintained flows of 
finance to the public sector during the crisis. 
Among the "natural resources owners", the Government of Chile had already attained a 
primary fiscal surplus before the outbreak of the crisis. The effects of the shocks of 1983/1984 
on the public budget and external accounts were mollified by ample net external finance to the 
government. From 1985 onward Chile was able to gradually restore its fiscal surplus by a 
systematic adjustment, supported by continuing external finance. Venezuela also entered the 
crisis from a fiscal surplus; after a slump in 1982, the government was able to maintain, more 
often than not, a surplus position closely linked to the fluctuations of its oil revenues. 
Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru entered the crisis with sizable fiscal deficits. Mexico 
underwent a staggering fiscal adjustment, without great external support, that turned adrift in 
1986. As mentioned earlier, a debt rescheduling in that year, at the brink of a formal 
moratorium, brought the government new external finance in 1987. The authorities started a new 
and successful fiscal adjustment process in 1988. Later the external financial squeeze was eased 
as a consequence of a turnaround of confidence in Mexico and a renewal of autonomous capital 
inflows, which were in turn greatly helped along by the denationalization of the banks, the 
expectations of a free trade zone with the United States and the symbolic effects of being the 
first customer for a Brady-style debt reduction exercise.31 
Ecuador also underwent a significant fiscal adjustment in 1984-1985 that was eroded after 
the 1985 drop in oil prices and disappeared altogether in 1987, after an earthquake's damage of 
export capacity affected both the external and fiscal balances and led to the country's 
moratorium. 
Bolivia was able to postpone a formal moratorium until 1984, when accumulating internal 
imbalances, an unsustainable public external debt burden and the collapse of export prices led 
to hyperinflation and economic and fiscal collapse. A selective moratorium, coupled with a 
draconian fiscal adjustment beginning in 1985, followed later by a supportive attitude on the 
part of official creditors and the 1988 buy-back of half of the commercial bank debt, allowed 
the country to maintain relative macroeconomic stability (Cariaga, 1992). 
Peru's pre-crisis situation of fiscal deficit improved during 1984-1985, while external 
adjustment took place and the government continued to receive net external finance, in the 
context of a quiet moratorium. The political decision of a new government to formalize and 
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radicalize the moratorium precluded new external finance for the public sector. However, 
macroeconomic stability was not seriously imperiled until domestic policy-induced fiscal and 
external imbalances pushed the economy into hyperinflation. 
Although not a "natural resources owner", Colombia's public sector has had direct access 
to foreign exchange through the coffee (compensatory) fund and, more recently, through its 
increasing exports of oil and coal. In 1981-1983 both the trade and fiscal deficits were sizable, 
but public external debt and its service were kept at relatively low levels. Sound macroeconomic 
management, and continuing net external finance for the public sector (at least until 1986), 
allowed the country to carry out gradual external and fiscal adjustments. 
The predicament of other "natural resources non-owner" governments has been quite 
different. In Argentina, the sizable pre-crisis fiscal deficit widened even more as a consequence 
of the assumption by the public sector of the private external debt and the rise in international 
interest rates. Although considerable trade surpluses were obtained in 1982-1985, due to a rapid 
external adjustment, the government was unable to either raise the tax burden or reduce public 
spending to the degree needed to service the growing public debt. After the strategic moratorium 
of 1983/1984 was abandoned, the Austral stabilization programme managed to reduce the fiscal 
deficit and obtain some fresh external money. When the situation on both fronts deteriorated, 
along with expectations and inflationary pressures, a de facto moratorium followed in 1988 
(Machinea and Sommer, 1992). 
Brazil sorted out the 1982 payments crisis and bore the burden of its external debt by 
obtaining huge trade surpluses. Significant primary fiscal surpluses until 1986 allowed the 
government to manage the growing burden of interest payments on the public budget. However, 
the reversal in 1985 of net external finance to the public sector further strained an already 
deteriorating fiscal balance. In such circumstances, the gaping deficit —now also fueled by the 
mounting burden of interest on the domestic public debt- and the eroding trade surplus were 
behind the moratorium of 1987. As mentioned earlier, although the moratorium was lifted the 
following year, the deteriorating fiscal situation amid accelerating inflation led to another 
moratorium in 1989. 
The fiscal situation in Uruguay had been relatively stable before the crisis and was 
gradually brought under control again, with the country achieving even primary surpluses 
beginning in 1985. The permanent trade surplus allowed for the external transfer, but the 
Uruguayan Government's difficulty in capturing domestically the corresponding resources has 
been evident in the significant inflationary tax that it has collected. In such circumstances, the 
strategy of avoiding a moratorium is better explained by the considerable proportion of dollar 
deposits in the financial system and the government's goal of maintaining its status as a regional 
financial center. 
Costa Rica had an almost even balance of trade, a solid primary fiscal surplus and 
abundant net external financing for its public sector. Its moratorium seems to be explained by 
the political requisites of achieving needed adjustment without significantly damaging the level 
of economic activity. 
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This analysis suggests that the regional drama of muddling through a protracted debt 
problem and the eventual emergence of moratoria is better understood as a story of debtor 
governments amid a systemic financial crisis than as a story of debtor coemtries trying to adjust 
to a new international economic situation. True, the external constraint was at the forefront of 
the payments crisis, and the export performance of each country continued to be the essential 
stand from which to approach it. But servicing of the debt chiefly rested upon the government's 
shoulders,32 thereby aggravating the fiscal deficit and the requirements for fiscal adjustment. 
At least four consequences stem from this situation. First, credit rationing to the 
countries has been, in fact, rationing of the governments' necessary rollover funds; hence, the 
role of multilateral or bilateral official finance has been much more strategic than their amounts 
would suggest. (See Q'Connell, 1992.) Second, underlying fiscal balances, after interest accrued 
on the public external debt, have been decisive in permitting countries to successfully muddle 
through the debt problem without resorting to moratoria. Third, the capacity of the government -
-based on its ownership of exports— to collect export earnings without domestic transfers and 
apply them to servicing the debt has also been decisive. Fourth, prospects for fresh finance, 
coupled with the political tolerance for IMF-style adjustments and lost output also entered into 
the moratorium calculation. Finally, strategic considerations in renegotiation of the debt could 
also be an important factor. 
IV. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MORATORIUM 
A moratorium must be administered in some way. One would expect the sophistication of that 
administration to vary according to the circumstances. A planned moratorium should have a 
more sophisticated administration than one that emerges suddenly due to an unexpected payments 
burden and/or a collapse of economic policy. The more conflictive a moratorium, the more 
complicated its management. One also would expect that the longer the moratorium is held in 
place, the more refined its management will become. All these observations are more or less 
borne out by the experience of the countries. 
A. The tone of the moratorium 
The vast majority of moratoria in Latin America have been quiet and discreet in nature. This 
has even characterized the strategy of revolutionary regimes such as those of Cuba and 
Sandinista Nicaragua.33 
The most conflictive strategy was adopted by the Garcia government in Peru. As 
mentioned earlier, it inherited a silent moratorium on the service of debt to the banks, 
governments and suppliers. During his Presidential campaign, Garcia had warned that his 
country could not have its growth compromised by the foreign debt and the recessive policies 
of the IMF. Even so, he informally had signaled to the banks that he was willing to renegotiate 
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the debt (Figueroa, 1992). Thus it was a surprise to the financial community when the 
President, upon assuming power in July 1985, publicly announced that over the next 12 months 
his country would unilaterally limit debt service on medium-term public debt to 10% of the 
country's exports. Thereafter, the government's rhetoric hardened and meetings with creditors 
became sporadic and conflictive. Hopes of a settlement evaporated when the government 
announced that the 10% formula would be renewed in July 1986 and would include private 
sector medium-term debt. 
Brazil's two moratoria with the banks never approached the high profile witnessed in 
Peru. Nevertheless, they did involve obvious and direct challenges to the official debt strategy. 
The first phase of the 1987 moratorium, managed by Minister Funaro, was rather aggressive in 
tone and did not articulate its objectives very clearly, or offer the banks many alternatives.34 
The administration of the moratorium's second phase, which began in May of that year under 
the leadership of a new Minister, Mr. Bresser Pereira, was much more constructive; 
nevertheless, the authorities also openly challenged the standard rescheduling/new money 
formula of the Baker Plan. The team insisted that an agreement must respect Brazil's capacity 
to pay (2.5% of GDP) and it eventually proposed an obligatory exchange of about one-half of 
the country's US$ 70 billion bank debt for bonds with a discount of 30%-40%. Given the banks' 
strong resistance to the scheme, there also was some consideration of the possibility of imposing 
it unilaterally (de Freitas, 1992). However, the proposal and the moratorium lost momentum in 
September, when the Minister was personally informed by the United States Treasury Secretary 
Baker that the Brazilian payment plan was a "non-starter". 
By late September the country had reached an understanding with the banks to eliminate 
arrears in an interim agreement that would be a prelude to an IMF programme and a debt 
restructuring package. Nevertheless, at the end of the year, the authorities began to reassess 
their bargaining position and reconsidered the possibility of imposing a unilateral exchange of 
debt for bonds (de Freitas, 1992). However, as events materialized, Minister Bresser Pereira 
resigned in December and his successor, Mailson da Nobrega, quietly led Brazil to a rather 
conventional restructuring accord in June 1988. 
Ironically, Brazil's second moratorium was initiated by Mailson da Nobrega, the same 
man who ended the first moratorium. Moreover, the second one began as quietly as the first had 
ended. The government's liquidity position had been deteriorating as the private banks and IMF 
were withholding disbursements of new loans on account of the country's inability to comply 
with the Fund's conditionality. By July of 1989 the government began to fall behind in some 
payments. The Minister made it clear that if an interim financing agreement was not reached 
with the IMF by September, when some US$ 2 billion of payments to the banks came due, he 
would be forced to suspend debt service in order to save international reserves. The expectations 
of a moratorium became so well entrenched by September that, when the interest payments were 
suspended, it was practically a non-event. The problem was passed onto a new government, 
which would be elected by the end of the year. 
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In March of 1990, the new Collor administration assumed a hard bargaining position 
jased on the public sector's capacity to pay. The banks insisted on payment of arrears as a 
condition for a global debt agreement. The government, on the other hand, made it clear that 
it would not make any payment prior to agreeing on a comprehensive restructuring accord which 
included a large reduction in interest payments. In October, the government presented a proposal 
to convert the stock of debt into bonds and decentralize negotiations of private sector debt. The 
proposal was quite sunn gemerns and largely outside of the framework of the Brady Plan, e.g., 
some of the bonds had an unprecedented maturity of 45 years; there was no provision at all for 
collateral and the private sector debt would be left to market forces. The banks rejected the idea 
outright and also were upset by Brazil's decision to break with tradition and not reimburse the 
travel expenses of the banks' Advisory Committee (The Economist. 1990).35 Brazil also was 
rebuffed when it informally proposed that a similar scheme should apply for Paris Club debt. 
From that point on the moratorium began to peter out as the economic team became more 
isolated and pressure increased on Brazil to conform to the bankers' demands. 
It already has been mentioned that Argentina's first moratorium had its conflictive 
moments, but these were interspersed with conciliatory gestures, such as when the government 
accepted a bridge loan to partially pay interest arrears and thereby avoid a downgrading of the 
United States bankers' debt (Machinea and Sommer, 1992). As already mentioned, in 1984 the 
Siles Zuazo government in Bolivia attempted to formalize a payments scheme for its moratorium 
by limiting payments to 25% of exports. It also apparently lobbied for a debtors' cartel. 
Finally, Costa Rica, generally a master of subtle debt negotiations, unwittingly raised the profile 
and conflict around its first moratorium by initiating it in August 1981 with a formal 
governmental decree (Rodriguez, 1992). 
Why would a country pursue a strategy of open conflict with its creditors? Domestic 
politics clearly played a role in Peru, where the debt and the IMF were used as negative foils 
in a populist domestic strategy. The Garcia government also apparently had ambitions to become 
the leader of a regional strategy on the foreign debt. Domestic politics also played a role in the 
tougher phases of the Brazilian moratoria. The first phase of the 1987 moratorium could have 
partially served to divert attention away from the collapse of the domestic economic program.36 
In the second phase, the economic team was also apparently motivated by the opinion that its 
ideas for dealing with the debt overhang were so rational that they would ultimately be 
acceptable to the governments of the creditor banks (de Freitas, 1992). As for Argentina, its 
tough strategy in the first moratorium may have been partly related to an anticipation of 
tolerance in official circles on account of the tremendous goodwill that the new democratic 
government enjoyed in the creditor countries (Machinea and Sommer, 1992; Frohmann, 1986 
and 1989). 
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B. The queue for payments 
A moratorium is rarely applied to all creditors; some selectivity usually comes into play. With 
regard to the loans by commercial banks, some banking analysts had argued in the 1970s that 
"the full and prompt servicing of debt to the lender has the highest priority in the usage of 
foreign exchange resources of a country" and would in effect be comparable in importance to 
the import of petroleum, food and pharmaceuticals (Friedman, 1980). That optimism proved 
incorrect in the case of Latin America, where the principal creditor was the commercial banks. 
Indeed, banks have usually been the primary target of moratoria in the region. The next most 
frequent target has been selective restrictions on Paris Club countries. (See Abbate, Lawrence 
and Miroux, 1992.) Only the most desperate cases have included the multilateral lenders in their 
moratorium (O'Connell, 1992) (see table 13). 
In restricting payments to the banks, countries have usually excluded short-term debt so 
as to dissuade lenders from cutting this credit, which is important for day-to-day external trade. 
Peru also exempted post-July 1985 debt to encourage new lending. Private sector unguaranteed 
bank debt has usually been included either formally, as in the first Brazilian moratorium and the 
Peruvian exercise (beginning in July of 1986),37 or informally due to the unavailability of 
foreign exchange at the Central Bank, or the existence of exchange rate guarantees of one type 
or another. But there are cases where private sector debt has been unaffected, as in the case of 
Argentina, Ecuador and Brazil in the latter part of its second moratorium. 
During a moratorium the countries have frequently made symbolic payments at one time 
or another on the restricted debt. More recently there has been a tendency to consistently service 
part of the bank debt according to some notion of the capacity to pay. For instance, in 1987-
1988 Costa Rica followed a policy of paying about 30% of its interest due to the banks 
(Rodriguez, 1992). As already mentioned, Ecuador and Argentina (during the second 
moratorium) formalized regular partial payments. And in its second moratorium, Brazil began 
to unilaterally service 30% of its interest due. Unfortunately, what began to appear as an 
encouraging pattern under the Brady Plan for orienting debt service to the capacity to pay, has 
been called into question by the already mentioned reversal of IMF policy in Brazil. 
The restriction of debt service to Paris Club countries usually has been simultaneous with, 
or lagged behind, the restriction on bank debt. However, Costa Rica's third moratorium, as well 
as those emerging in Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, were started by restrictions on the 
Club's obligations (see table 13). Paris Club governments have often unwittingly made 
themselves targets by permitting their export credit agencies to restrict new loans even to debtor 
governments completing IMF condionality and reschedulings. The excessive rigidity of the 
Club's rescheduling techniques has also been a problem. (See Abbate, Lawrence and Miroux, 
1992.) Available information suggests that payments to creditor countries have usually been 
restricted according to political considerations, the degree of tolerance of the creditor 
governments, and whether there were prospects of a positive transfer of resources. For example, 
Peru and Argentina selectively resumed payments on German debt in order to be eligible for a 
new project loan (Figueroa, 1992; Machinea and Sommer, 1992). Costa Rica also stayed current 
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on United States Government debt because of the potentially large amount of funding available 
from that country (Rodriguez, 1992). 
The only countries to have seriously restricted multilateral debt service are Peru, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Guatemala and Honduras (O'Connell, 1992).38 The restriction invariably 
has coincided with a fall-off in new disbursements, usually related to an inability to comply with 
the multilateral institution's conditionally. Nevertheless, most countries have continued to 
service multilateral debt even in the face of problems with conditionality and the consequent 
negative transfers of resources. This reflected the perceived political importance of avoiding 
conflicts on this front. 
Finally, only two countries introduced a formal ceiling on the total service of debt by 
linking payments to a percentage of exports: as mentioned earlier, in 1984 the Siles Zuazo 
government used a formula of 25% and the Garcia administration applied a 10% rule. Under 
these formulas practically all the banks and a large number of the Paris Club governments were 
excluded from debt service. On the other hand, multilateral were given priority access to 
foreign exchange. However, in Peru, the IMF —with which there were no prospects of a 
program— was immediately affected by the 10% formula, leading in August 1986 to a formal 
declaration of ineligibility by that institution. In early 1987, Peru also stopped payments to the 
World Bank. And in mid-1988 the restriction was applied to the IDB (Figueroa, 1992). 
C. Defensive measures 
The conventional view is that a moratorium will risk devastating retaliation from disgruntled 
creditors. At risk is everything from loss Of short-term lines of credit to the attachment of 
reserves, exports, airplanes and other tangible assets of a government.39 Countries therefore 
might be expected to protect themselves from such risk, especially in cases of a prolonged 
moratorium, or one which is surrounded by real or potential conflict. 
1. International reserves 
Reserves and other deposits of the defaulting government are vulnerable to legal 
attachment. A country is particularly vulnerable in the United States, where a dangerous tactic 
called a "set-off" is commonly used. In effect, it allows a bank to recover an overdue payment 
by directly attaching a deposit of the relevant debtor. Moreover, this can be done without any 
prior court approval.40 While the international reserves of a country should enjoy sovereign 
immunity, in the post-war era the legal interpretation of this concept has narrowed to such a 
degree that there is considerable risk, especially in the United States, of a country's official 
assets being treated as commercial in nature (Biggs, 1992). 
A strategy observed in Argentina, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Brazil and Peru was the gradual 
withdrawal of reserves from commercial banks that were considered to be "unsafe". In all these 
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cases, United States banks, which tended to have a more aggressive attitude, and of course 
access to the set-off, were considered unreliable. Peru and Ecuador also tried to avoid any banks 
with which they had a debt, and small banks, which traditionally can be cantankerous. 
A common safe haven for all these countries was the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) in Basle. However, Peru found that this Bank succumbed to outside pressure and 
severely restricted the amount of deposits that it could place there. The authorities explored the 
possibility of using the Andean Reserve Fund (ARF) in Bogota as a depository, but, in the end, 
the country's lawyers deemed it unsafe. (Subsequently, the ARF developed a safe CD). Thus, 
Peru deposited in numbered accounts of banks in Europe and in subsidiaries at financial centers. 
With some difficulty, it often secured formal comfort letters from the bank which pledged that 
it would not embargo deposits (Figueroa, 1992). Ecuador also pursued a similar strategy. Peru 
furthermore converted part of its reserves into gold, which it flew back to Lima. 
Argentina considered the United States Federal Reserve (FED) to be a safe haven during 
its second moratorium (Machinea and Sommer, 1992). On the other hand, Brazil, which had 
used the FED as a safe haven during the uncertain rescheduling negotiations of 1982-1983, 
considered this institution unsafe during the 1987 moratorium (de Freitas, 1992). Meanwhile, 
throughout the 1980s, Costa Rica also used as a safe haven the Banco Latinoamericano de 
Exportaciones in Panama, as well as a subsidiary of a consortium of government banks, also 
located in Panama (Rodriguez, 1992). 
In preparation for the 1987 moratorium, Brazil carefully withdrew its deposits from the 
United States via a circuitous route. However, it needed to have a clearing institution in that 
country because of its large-scale export trade in dollars. The authorities found a large bank 
which promised not to attach any deposits in return for the exclusive business of clearing 
accounts due. However, the bank refused to offer a comfort letter and instead the two parties 
relied on a gentlemen's agreement (De Freitas, 1992). 
Costa Rica also encountered a large bank which offered a plan in which the country could 
overdraw on an account and cancel the negative balance at the end of the day. In this way the 
country enjoyed a degree of liquidity without having any assets in attachable deposits 
(Rodriguez, 1992). 
In addition to withdrawing official reserves, Peru and Brazil also warned all government 
entities to avoid unsafe depository institutions, and especially those located in the United States. 
On the other hand, in 1988-1989, Argentina -which had not declared a formal moratorium- did 
not take any special precautionary measures in this regard (Machinea and Sommer, 1992). 
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2. Short-term lines of credit 
Commercial lines of credit are particularly vulnerable to reduction, because they are 
short-term and subject to regular renewal. Indeed, information on Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil indicates that all these countries were subject to pressure 
along these lines during their respective moratoria. There were interesting differences in the way 
the countries dealt with the problem. 
Bolivia's moratorium in the early 1980s emerged gradually and in uncertain fashion. By 
early 1983, the banks were aggressively eliminating credit lines to the private and public sectors; 
moreover, this happened so quickly, and the authorities had so many other problems to deal 
with, that few countervailing measures emerged (Cariaga, 1992). Ecuador also did not take any 
special measures to guard against loss of short-term credit; it simply concentrated business in 
the handful of banks and export credit agencies that remained willing to do business with the 
country (Yepez, 1992). On the other hand, Costa Rica actively shopped around to replace 
eliminated lines with new ones. In the early and mid-1980s it found that European banks ~ 
especially Spanish ones— and United States banks without exposure in Costa Rica, could 
substitute for the retreating creditors. When the European banks became a difficult source of 
supply in 1987, the country found that their United States competitors were more receptive to 
the extension of short-term credit. Costa Rica also relied on continued cover by the United States 
EXIMBANK, which insured some commercial lines. Finally, it deployed foreign exchange 
denominated capital of its State banks to open new lines of credit (Rodriguez, 1992). 
During its second conciliatory moratorium, Argentina largely relied on the banks to 
respect the "captive" lines of credit, which were negotiated with them in prior rescheduling 
agreements,41 and the use of foreign exchange controls in the official sector (Machinea and 
Sommer, 1992). Peru also tried to make the banks respect the captive lines from earlier 
reschedulings. It substituted lost lines by shopping around, especially at banks without exposure 
in Peru, and frequently by collateralizing new lines with foreign exchange reserves, including 
gold. The country also placed a minimum amortization period on import financing to induce 
foreign firms to bring in their own capital (Figueroa, 1992). 
The most sophisticated strategy was applied in Brazil. During the 1987 moratorium, the 
Central Bank froze the country's captive lines of credit. In effect, banks were not allowed to 
reduce that credit; they could only recirculate it upon maturity to new customers within the 
country and charge the prevailing commercial rate. On the other hand, voluntary lines, i.e., 
those in addition to the captive lines, were left to the forces of supply and demand. When the 
banks shortened export financing excessively, the government countered by opening up special 
lines of credit out of its own resources. (A more drastic contingency plan for dealing with 
problems in this area never had to be drawn upon). Meanwhile, in the second Brazilian 
moratorium of 1989-1991, the government chose not to freeze captive lines. An attempt was 
made to substitute lost credit by redeployment of certain foreign exchange resources in the 
domestic banking system and by more intensive use of domestic savings (de Freitas, 1992). 
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Finally, it should be noted that all of the above-mentioned countries used prices to clear 
markets. This usually involved some rise in the price of credit, due to collateral or higher 
spreads. One extreme case was Argentina, in 1989. With the economy on the edge of a 
hyperinflation, the exchange market collapsed and spreads rose to 4-5 points over LIBOR 
(Machinea and Sommer, 1992). 
D. Other measures 
To avoid retaliation, countries often tried to maintain a dialogue and cordial relations with their 
multilateral creditors -especially the IMF— and the key OECD governments, especially the 
United States; Costa Rica pursued this course of action very effectively after 1982. So did 
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Argentina. When law suits emerged, all the countries tried to deal with 
them discreetly, and as a special case, in order to reduce bad publicity. In the second 
moratorium, Argentina avoided cash settlements to recalcitrant lenders in order not to provide 
incentives to other banks (Machinea and Sommer, 1992). 
National consensus building on the issue of moratorium was also another defensive 
measure. In Costa Rica officials purposely organized seminars, workshops, and TV and radio 
programs to inform businessmen and the public at large of the country's problem of 
overindebtedness (Rodriguez, 1992). Meanwhile, President Garcia's charisma and political 
campaign mobilized a latent consensus in crisis-ridden and IMF-weary Peru. Bolivia's formal 
pact between the government and the country's labor union in 1984 is suggestive of some type 
of consensus building there. Meanwhile, Paz Estenssoro's government built a consensus around 
its stabilization program, which subordinated the payment on part of the debt to the need to close 
internal and external macroeconomic gaps (Cariaga, 1992). As for Ecuador, the unexpected 
sharp fall of the price of petroleum, coupled with an earthquake, produced a type of national 
consensus there about the country's inability to service debt. On the other hand, Brazil's 1987 
moratorium appeared to lack such a consensus (de Freitas, 1992).42 
V. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MORATORIUM STRATEGY 
The effects of a moratorium can be transmitted through an extremely large number of channels. 
This, coupled with the need to introduce broad counterfactuals, makes a precise evaluation of 
the impact of a moratorium somewhat problematical. In any event, a comprehensive evaluation 
is beyond the scope of this overview. What we will do, however, is draw from some of the 
more obvious aspects of the experience, to make tentative observations about the efficacy of a 
moratorium as an instrument of economic and political policy, and as a platform for 
renegotiating the debt. 
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A. Economic performance 
Perhaps the bottom-line concern is how well the economy performed during its moratorium in 
payments. Arrears are conventionally not considered to be the way to good economic 
performance. And, indeed, the vast majority of countries in moratorium during the 1980s 
performed very poorly. It can be observed that the moratorium countries are crowded in the 
right-hand corner of Table 14, which expresses a situation of low or sporadic growth combined 
with important inflationary problems. The only moratorium countries that have displayed growth 
in a controlled inflationary setting are Costa Rica, and, more recently, Paraguay. Meanwhile, 
although Bolivia did not achieve much growth during its long moratorium, in 1985 the Paz 
Estenssoro administration did undertake a world-acclaimed stabilization programme which rid 
the country of a hyperinflation. Cuba and Honduras also can at least point to price stability 
during their periods of moratorium. Finally, Guatemala has recently registered some growth, 
but with considerable inflation. 
Based on our simplified proxies of economic performance, only five countries had 
something positive to show during their respective moratoria. This experience does not provide 
much encouragement for a temporary arrears-based economic strategy. 
On the other hand, the problem debtor countries that continued to service their debt 
contractually also had a mixed experience. Chile is the only country which registered a long 
period of growth with relative price stability. Mexico has more recently joined the group (and 
Venezuela's prospects for the 1990s have improved) (see table 14).43 All three countries, but 
above all Mexico, have also gained renewed access to international capital markets (West, 
1991). 
Chile was a "model" debtor during the 1980s. Mexico was too, although on more than 
one occasion it wielded a tough threat of default to make the bankers accede to a more 
favourable rescheduling agreement. Both nations are on the so-called Washington Consensus' 
list of countries that seriously pursued policy reform in the 1980s (Williamson, 1990). The two 
borrowers were almost always on good terms with the IMF. Both nations had political systems 
which gave the economic authorities considerably more degrees of freedom than are found in 
most other countries of the region.44 The countries' governments are also owners of important 
natural resource exports. 
Clearly, the two most distinguished moratorium cases are Costa Rica and Bolivia. Both 
countries were in arrears with one or more of their principal creditors for most of the 1980s. 
Although Costa Rica and Bolivia took firm stances on their limited capacity to pay, they —from 
1982 and 1985, respectively— discreetly and constructively engaged their creditors and worked 
hard to arrive at settlements. Both countries underwent adjustment and stabilization programs 
that gained international respect and put them on the Washington Consensus' list of serious 
policy reformers (Williamson, 1990). At the same time, both borrowers eventually undertook 
IMF adjustment programs (Khan, 1990). Costa Rica is an established democracy, while Bolivia 
is what has been termed a transitional democracy (Kaufman and Stailings, 1989). 
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Paraguay, the other moratorium country in the upper left hand corner of Table 14, has 
had a growing payments restriction throughout most of the 1980s. In recent years it has pursued 
policy reform and is a newcomer to the Washington Consensus' list (Williamson, 1990). It has 
not had a programme with the IMF. The country became a transitional democracy in 1989. 
As for Cuba its achievement of price stability is basically attributable to a long-reigning 
system of rigid controls and a stable exchange rate made possible by special bilateral aid flows. 
Honduras benefitted from price controls and considerable bilateral assistance related to the 
conflict in Central America. Finally, Guatemala's growth coincided with an overall improvement 
in economic policy reform in 1986-1988 under its new democratic regime; however, thereafter 
the country has backtracked substantially. It has not had a programme with the Fund. 
Among the best economic performers in Table 14, there are those countries which 
operated in a moratorium setting and those that did not. The countries exhibit very different 
socio-economic characteristics, but where there is some overlap is in their respectable economic 
programs. Thus, as a first approximation, it might be suggested that the economic benefits of 
a moratorium will be limited if the latter is not an integral part of a coherent and sustainable 
economic adjustment program. The link to economic policy is further strengthened when one 
considers that in all the cases the payments restrictions themselves were generally well 
administered. 
B. The transfer of resources 
As can be seen in Table 15, the moratorium countries which have received the most attention 
in this paper all significantly reduced their credit-related outward transfer of resources during 
periods of restricted debt-service payments. The most radical reduction was in Peru, where the 
negative credit-related transfer fell sharply and actually turned positive in 1987-1988. The 
mildest restriction on the credit-related transfer is observed in Costa Rica. The more favourable 
credit-related transfers, moreover, were usually paralleled by an improvement in the overall 
transfer.45 
The moratoria also were associated with reduced internal restrictions. In effect, available 
information indicates that during periods of moratoria the governments generally were able to 
sharply reduce interest payments on the external public debt as a percentage of public revenue 
(see table 5). 
While the moratoria were generally associated with lower internal and external transfers, 
it must also be asked whether a similar or better result could have been achieved by participation 
in the official debt program, which in principle opened up access to new medium-term credit, 
as well as the renewal of captive short-term lines. Indeed, by using this logic, a postmortem 
analysis of the 1987 Brazilian moratorium, prepared by the country's Central Bank, concluded 
that there was a net cash loss to the country of US$ 700 million (de Freitas, 1992). However, 
studies like this tend to beg the central issue: in all the countries, what led to a moratorium in 
the first place was an inability to access predictable and adequate new financing within the 
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framework of the official debt strategy. The first bottleneck, in nearly every case, was an 
inability to comply with tight IMF quarterly targets, which in turn paralyzed multilateral 
disbursements and also any that had been committed by the commercial banks and other 
creditors. The second obstacle was the great reluctance of the banks and official export credit 
agencies to commit themselves to adequate, sustained and predictable new lending in the first 
place. In effect, in these circumstances a moratorium often was not so much a choice as a 
forced response to the increasingly weak refinancing mechanisms in the international debt 
strategy. 
C. The effectiveness of defensive measures 
The moratoria never produced massive retaliation by the creditors. Problems of course arose on 
different fronts, but there usually were reasonably effective tools for dealing with them. On the 
other hand, the countries' defenses were the weakest at times when the domestic economic 
programme fell into disarray. Indeed, as soon as a domestic economic programme lost its way, 
formerly effective defensive measures became much less effective. Moreover, capital flight 
would reappear as a serious problem, as was the case in Argentina and Peru (Machinea and 
Sommer, 1992 and Figueroa, 1992). 
All the countries were invariably harassed by sporadic lawsuits and set-offs that required 
quiet bilateral negotiations and legal defenses. A Costa Rican defense early on in the crisis 
initially established a precedent which —if it had been sustained— would have dramatically 
improved the entire character of the international management of the debt crisis. In effect, the 
country found itself confronting a battery of legal proceedings after a severe economic crisis 
caused the Carazo government to decree a debt moratorium in 1981. However, all but one of 
the suits were quietly settled by bilateral negotiations and Costa Rica's eventual entry into the 
first round of reschedulings. The remaining holdout, a small United States bank which had 
participated in a syndicated loan organized by Allied Bank, refused to settle and pursued the 
matter in United States courts. 
The case is legally complicated,46 but in essence the Costa Rican defence initially 
prevailed: the court agreed that Costa Rican banks could not service their foreign debt because 
it would have violated the law of a sovereign state. An appeal by the United States bank also 
failed. On this occasion, the court found that Costa Rica's debt programme was consistent with 
United States foreign policy; to wit, the restriction on payments was similar to a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy, in which the country temporarily restricted payments as a prelude to the debt 
reschedulings which the United States Government supported. However, the bankruptcy analogy 
created great concern in United States financial and Governmental circles. The case was taken 
to a rare appeal in Washington D.C. and this time the bank carried a letter of support from the 
executive branch of the United States Government. In a reversal that appeared somewhat 
arbitrary, the court ruled against Costa Rica and declared that the actions of the government 
were tantamount to confiscation. After the ruling the matter was completely dropped by the 
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United States bank, which decided to join the global rescheduling agreement (Biggs, 1992; 
Rodríguez, 1992). 
Another very publicized retaliation occurred in Ecuador when Citicorp set-off US$ 80 
million of governmental deposits in early 1989. However, this took place at a time when 
Ecuador -feeling at no risk due to the conciliatory nature of its moratorium- had absolutely 
no defensive strategy in place. The matter is still a subject of negotiations. In the meantime, 
a strategy has emerged to protect reserves and other assets (Yepez, 1992). 
In early 1990, Peru —which had engaged in isolated legal skirmishes with some lenders 
in the late 1980s— found that 25 banks from different countries had as a group initiated court 
proceedings to avoid legal prescription of their rights to US$ 8 billion of debt on which Peru had 
made no payment (Latin American Weekly Report. 1990). The action by the banks was 
interpreted by many as a formality designed to retain a claim on the debts.47 In any event, the 
new Fujimori government —which is actively exploring ways to settle the debt problem- has 
negotiated at least a temporary halt in the proceedings. 
The initiation of a moratorium always put pressure on short term lines of credit. But most 
of the countries were able to deal with the problem by aggressively shopping for new lines (this 
is an attractive low risk business for a bank) and by deployment of countervailing measures. The 
Garcia administration's system of stabilizing lines with collateral initially enjoyed a degree of 
success; indeed, after a fall of 40% between June of 1983 and December 1985, the volume of 
the country's lines recovered, rising by 20% through June 1987 (Figueroa, 1992). Thereafter, 
short term credit started to fall sharply. This, however, was not due to the moratorium as such; 
rather it reflects the effects of the collapse of the government's political project and heterodox 
economic program, as well as its populist demand management, which led to the exhaustion of 
the international reserves that initially were used so effectively to collaterize lines and shore-up 
domestic confidence. 
In view of the very conciliatory nature of its second moratorium, Argentina basically 
relied on the banks' willingness to respect the captive, or negotiated, lines. Since this short-term 
credit was not administered from the Central Bank, it was very difficult to control leakage. 
Nevertheless, the credit situation remained relatively stable and, indeed, in the first year of the 
moratorium, commercial credit actually rose. The credit crunch that exploded in the second 
quarter of 1989 was largely part of a general collapse of confidence due to expectations of 
hyperinflation (Machinea and Sommer, 1992). 
Costa Rica's and Ecuador's systems of shopping apparently worked adequately. Ecuador 
noted a significant net reduction in lines to the public sector, but demand also was low, due to 
the recessive effects of the adjustment process (Yepez, 1992). 
Brazil's centralized administration of captive lines worked reasonably well. Lines were 
relatively stable during the first half of the year and declined by about US$ 1 billion thereafter. 
Thus, at the end of the year, credit volume was only about 6% below pre-moratorium levels (de 
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Freitas, 1992). On the other hand, all voluntary short-term credit -purposely excluded from the 
previously described forced recycling mechanism- was lost. That amounted to about US$ 1 
billion. 
As part of a bargaining tactic, in the second moratorium Brazil did not deploy a forced 
recycling mechanism. Preliminary information suggests that it lost around 35% of its short-term 
lines of credit. However, it apparently was able to partially compensate for this loss by more 
intensive use of domestic savings and by drawing on resources in the country's banking system. 
Brazil -the largest developing-country debtor- may also be the country that has suffered 
the greatest official pressure during its moratoria. As already mentioned, during the 1987 
moratorium the World Bank's lending programme to the government mysteriously stalled. 
Government officials also apparently were "spooked" by vague rumors of possible trade 
sanctions by the United States (de Freitas, 1992). In 1990-1991 the government found its lending 
programs in the World Bank once again stalled. And, in the IDB, the United States used its new 
veto power to block loans from this institution. Brazil also received a public message of concern 
from the Group of Seven countries when they issued their official statement for the 1990 
Houston Summit. 
Finally, in 1987, Brazil and Argentina apparently explored the possibility of cooperating 
with defensive measures in a joint moratorium. Brazil was already in a moratorium and 
Argentina was having great difficulty complying with the payments of the rescheduling 
agreement it had signed with the banks at the beginning of the year. It was later revealed that 
there were serious conversations at the Ministerial and Presidential levels about cooperation. 
Nothing, however, materialized from the initiative, perhaps in part because of the sharply 
deteriorating domestic political and economic situations of the two governments and the inherent 
difficulties of coordinating a common position on debt (de Freitas, 1992; Machinea and Sommer, 
1992; Devlin 1989). 
D. The moratorium as political tool 
The moratorium was an explicit political tool in President Garcia's Peru, Brazil (1987 and 1990-
1991), and Bolivia in 1984. It also could have served as an implicit political tool in countries 
which were adjusting and demanding large sacrifices from their citizens. The latter strategy is 
difficult to evaluate even tentatively. The former lends itself more easily to some preliminary 
comment. 
The Peruvian strategy seems to have initially generated political capital for the Garcia 
administration. There is little doubt about the strong internal consensus regarding the inadequate 
terms proposed by the creditors. We would postulate that disillusionment with the moratorium -
-reflected in the Fujimori government's attempt to end it quickly— really reflected broader 
disillusionment with the Garcia government's overall economic programme and political project. 
The turning point in the government's programme seems to have been the announcement of the 
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nationalization of the local banking system in July 1987. There also was disillusionment in some 
domestic circles about the decision to extend the moratorium to multilateral development 
agencies. As for regional leadership, the strident tone of the Garcia government's debt policy 
caused other Latin American governments to keep their distance. 
It was mentioned that the 1987 Brazilian moratorium could have been partly inspired by 
the need to divert attention away from the failing Cruzado Plan. But, with the economy already 
in trouble and no successful new plan emerging, the moratorium did little to reverse the 
declining political fortunes of the Sarney administration. The government that followed inherited 
the country's second moratorium. The political capital of this latter restriction was intimately 
linked to the performance of the government's economic program, which began to falter in the 
second semester of 1990. 
Finally, the 1984 Bolivian moratorium did serve to temporarily soothe the country's 
powerful labor union. 
E. The effectiveness of moratoria as a bargaining tool 
In principle, a payments restriction could be a bargaining tool for a better deal with the 
creditors. A moratorium generally sharply lowers the market value of a country's debt. It also 
can decrease the value of neighboring debt due to demonstration effects. If creditors are unable 
to effectively retaliate to force a settlement favourable to them, then they may eventually be 
willing to recognize part of the erosion of the value of their assets via concessions in a final debt 
settlement. Indeed, if the moratorium is perceived to be sustainable in the medium term, 
creditors will be better off with a settlement because payments will surely rise above moratorium 
levels. However, creditors also will take into account any negative externalities that may be 
generated for them by such an agreement. 
In any event, one indication of the afore-mentioned leverage may be the fact that Costa 
Rica and Bolivia have negotiated the most ambitious debt reduction settlements in Latin America 
to date. In 1990, Costa Rica finalized a Brady Plan agreement which generated a net reduction 
of principal of 20% and a net saving of more than 30% in the country's interest bill.48 In 
transactions carried out in 1988 and 1989, Bolivia bought back about three quarters of its bank 
debt (plus associated interest arrears) at 11 cents on the dollar; arrears continued to accumulate 
in those banks which refused to participate. It also was one of the first countries to receive the 
Paris Club's Toronto terms, which allow for some modest reduction of official bilateral debt 
(Abbate, Lawrence and Miroux, 1992). 
On the other hand, moratoria do not appear to have increased the leverage of other 
countries. As mentioned, the result of Argentina's first moratorium was a rather standard third 
round rescheduling. From the beginning, Brazil's 1987 moratorium was interpreted by bankers 
as politically unsustainable; indeed, the 1988 rescheduling agreement reflected the political need 
to restore relations with the banks as soon as possible. Venezuela's brief partial moratorium in 
1989/1990 resulted in a rather standard Brady debt reduction accord. It remains to be seen what 
type of debt settlements will emerge in the 1990s from Ecuador, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, 
as well as other debtors in moratoria with the banks. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The debt buildup in Latin America had its origin in domestically induced structural imbalances 
in the debtor economies, external shocks and a classically permissive expansionary cycle of 
international credit. Since the correction of imbalances also requires a profound reform of 
policy regimes and institutions, adjustment and restoration of creditworthiness in the region is 
a painfully slow process. 
Nevertheless, due to the initial effectiveness of the ILLR, and a cooperative attitude in 
Latin America, defaults were slow to emerge in the region and a world financial collapse was 
avoided. However, the ILLR's inability to mobilize adequate and predictable compensatory 
refinancing in support of growth-oriented structural adjustment; the fact that financing was cross-
conditioned with overly rigid IMF quarterly targets; the inflexibility of rescheduling techniques; 
the progressive spread of debt fatigue in the countries; and the emergence of serious coordinating 
problems in the creditor cartel, coupled with the afore-mentioned inherent difficulty and 
slowness of internal structural reforms, all contributed to a generalization of moratoria as the 
1980s progressed. 
While the moratoria in the region appear to have been effective as temporary instruments 
in reducing the internal and external transfers, the strategy clearly has not been generally 
associated with economic or even political success. Experience suggests that the necessary 
condition for a turnaround in the economic fortunes of a country in a moratorium is the same 
as that for a country which continues to service its debt: a minimum threshold of political 
support (quite broad in a pluralistic regime and more narrow in one that is authoritarian), 
coupled with a coherent economic programme that addresses itself to eliminating basic 
disequilibria. With the aforementioned domestic economic and political components firmly in 
place, an efficiently managed moratorium can temporarily ease the transfer problem and provide 
more net financing in support of adjustment than the country could expect to obtain from the 
official international debt program. It was exactly in this context that a moratorium was found 
to be a critical element in the success of the Costa Rican and Bolivian adjustment and 
stabilization efforts (Cariaga, 1992; Rodriguez, 1992). Meanwhile, the second moratorium in 
Brazil was viewed as essential to avoiding an outbreak of hyperinflation (de Freitas, 1992). 
It is clear then that declaring a formal moratorium, or falling into a de facto one, will 
not by itself produce many benefits, and indeed could lead to large net losses. Effective 
moratoria have been part of a larger and complex policy package. First, it has been essential that 
a national consensus develops around a serious and sustainable adjustment effort. The financing 
needs of that effort helped to define and legitimize the moratorium as well as discipline the use 
of resources. An internationally respectable economic programme also helped to galvanize 
30 
official tolerance abroad and keep image-conscious creditors on the defensive. An effective 
economic and political programme also strengthened the bargaining power of the economic team 
by enhancing its credibility and making the moratorium seem more sustainable to the creditors. 
On the other hand, a deteriorating economic programme merely undermined the credibility of 
the moratorium and the bargaining power of the economic authorities. 
Successful moratoria have been administered with caution and flexibility. Quiet de facto 
moratoria have been more effective than formal ones. Maintenance of a constructive dialogue 
with the creditors has proven, not only tactically useful, but also practical. In effect, a 
moratorium must be temporary in nature, because while it can relieve the negative cash-flow 
effects of overindebtedness, it cannot relieve its distorting impact on private investment 
decisions.49 Thus, the sooner the government can negotiate a satisfactory settlement with its 
creditors, the better. Symbolic or partial payments on part of the current debt service may be 
a way to keep that dialogue fluid. Not only does it display good faith, but it also keeps banks 
interested in dialogue; on the one hand, it gives them an opportunity to pressure the country for 
higher payments; on the other, they know that intransigence on their part could lead to a cut in 
the payments that are being made. 
A moratorium has been less conflictive when the authorities' proposals for a settlement 
have not publicly challenged the prevailing framework of official debt management. An IMF 
program, or at least an Article IV consultation, has proved useful, especially when it has 
validated ex-post an economic programme that the domestic authorities had already implemented 
and could successfully commit themselves to; it has also been a way to put an official umbrella 
over temporary arrears-based financing of adjustment. Unfortunately, the Fund can be an 
unreliable ally because of its vulnerability to the changing political winds in the Group of Seven 
countries. As already mentioned, pressure by the banks on the Group of Seven over the Brady 
Plan's tolerance of arrears has already produced one important setback for the international 
management of the debt problem. 
Arrears with multilateral agencies have proven counterproductive. They erode the 
tolerance of the official sector and -given a political unwillingness to exploit the possibilities 
of rescheduling-, once accumulated, are extremely difficult to eliminate (O'Connell, 1992). 
Arrears with the Paris Club are counterproductive when they affect countries whose political 
support is needed during the moratoria. Friendly gestures to key Group of Seven countries and 
lead banks in non-debt related matters have also been a way to reduce tension around a 
moratorium.50 
No matter how conciliatory a moratorium may be, the Ecuadorian experience with a set-
off confirmed the need for protection of reserves and other assets. Short-term lines have also 
often needed protection. While problems in this area are inevitable, experience has shown that 
there are effective, albeit somewhat costly, ways to protect liquidity. 
Countries must also anticipate that a moratorium against one set of creditors will likely 
have negative repercussions on the disposition of other lenders to disburse. In many cases, 
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however, this will be only a theoretical problem since loans are often tied to unrealistic 
conditionality and also can be blocked by creditor "revulsion" during a systemic crisis. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the bigger a country's debt is, the more likely there 
will be conflict around a moratorium. From 1982 onward, Costa Rica was careful to avoid 
conflict with its creditors. However, it was continually in a moratorium and quietly proposed 
unconventional payment formulas, based on its capacity to pay (Rodriguez, 1992). Had the 
country been a megadebtor, its unconventional tactics might have drawn more publicity and 
pushed the country into more conflict. 
In sum, a successful temporary moratorium strategy requires a complex set of conditions 
that most countries have not been able to organize. Nevertheless, as long as the international 
debt strategy does not adequately address the problem of overindebtedness and related structural 
impediments to growth, moratoria will remain a problem in the region.51 
The Brady Plan's original idea of tolerating arrears as a way of temporarily financing 
adjustment was a valuable innovation. First, it could break down the bankers' resistance to debt 
reduction and act as an "escape valve" for the Brady Plan's serious problem of underfunding.52 
It also allowed moratorium countries to link-up in one form or another with the IMF and, 
thereby, avoid go-it-alone policies like those of Peru, which sometimes can become very 
destructive. Unfortunately, however, bankers are increasingly concerned about the precedents 
of settling with countries in arrears. Moreover, their leverage in official circles has seemed to 
increase recently, as in the case of Brazil leading the IMF and other multilateral lenders to relink 
their adjustment programs to prior agreements with the banks. A generalization of this 
trend —without a corresponding effort to strengthen the current international debt strategy-
would increase the requirements for internal economic and political coherence in the moratorium 
countries. Indeed, in view of the current shortcomings of the international debt strategy, the 
more internal weaknesses push a country into a settlement with its creditors, the less satisfactory 
that settlement is likely to be. 
Notes 
1. In contrast to domestic markets, where the LLR is well defined and usually located in a central bank and/or 
the government treasury, at the international level its operation is much more complex and ad hoc. However postwar 
practice suggests that it is constituted by an informal, decentralized alliance of the G-7 governments, some of their 
big commercial banks, and major multilateral lenders, especially the IMF. While decentralized, the axis of 
movement is the G-7 governments, and that leadership is often delegated to the country with the closest political 
and commercial ties to the country or region in crisis.(See Wellons, 1987.) 
2. For instance, major U.S. banks had loans to Latin America in excess of 180% of their capital (ECLAC, 
1988). 
3. The negotiated price of the loans was between 100% and 250% greater than that prevailing before the crisis 
(Devlin, 1989). 
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4. For more details on the debt strategy, see ECLAC (1985). 
5. Wellons (1987). The net income of the banks actually rose in the early years of the crisis (ECLAC, 1988). 
6. The nature of each round of rescheduling is fully analyzed by ECLAC (1985, 1988, 1990a). 
7. By the end of the year, however, Costa Rica and Venezuela had also regularized their payments. 
8. "Moratorium" is used loosely here to describe the existence of protracted interest arrears and the absence 
of a clear agreement to eliminate them. Arrears on amortization payments occurred frequently in the 1980s but 
these were not very conflictive as long as the interest on the debt was paid promptly. 
9. The defaults started in early 1931 with Bolivia, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia and Brazil, followed 
by El Salvador and Uruguay in 1932 and by Panama and Cuba in 1933. By the mid 1930s, 80% of the region's 
debt was in default. The only countries to avoid default were Argentina (on federal debt), Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic. (Skiles 1988; ECLAC 1965.) 
10. However, the country was adversely affected by the systemic withdrawal of creditors from the region as 
a whole. Consequently, Colombia has had to negotiate administrative refinancing of amortization payments. 
11. The data on arrears are evidently very poor and the figures in the tables should therefore be used with 
caution. We suspect that the tables underestimate arrears. For instance, the commercial banks, which presumably 
are very strict about such matters, provide figures for interest arrears on their loans (See Annex, Table A 1) that 
often exceed the interest arrears on the total debt presented in Table 1. The figures also differ from those found 
in IMF balance of payments data and national sources. 
12. Arrears also were registered in Brazil. These, however, were extremely minor and related to technical 
aspects of the debt negotiations. 
13. For details on the organization of the Consensus, see Tussie (1988). 
14. Venezuela more quietly stonewalled by not agreeing to a rescheduling and accumulating arrears on 
amortization payments. However, by remaining current on the payment of interest, it kept conflict levels low 
(Fossati, 1991). 
15. For the rescheduling and new money, respectively, the military government had agreed in the first round 
to a spread over LIBOR of 2.13 % and 2.50%, an amortization period of 7 and 5 years and a commission of 1.25 % 
flat. The respective figures for the third round of reschedulings were 1.38% and 1.63%, 12 and 10 years, and a 
commission of 0 .58 % flat paid only on the new money. Mexico earlier had initiated the third round by rescheduling 
with a margin of 1.13% over LIBOR and a maturity of 14 years. In contrast with Argentina, Mexico did not 
request new "involuntary" loans, in part because it thought by forgoing them it could re-enter the voluntary credit 
market. The strategy of course did not work. 
16. This explains the sharp rise in this country's interest arrears in 1985. The policy of withholding payments 
to the Paris Club lasted until early 1986. (See de Freitas, 1992). 
17. Mr. Baker promised to raise new net lending of US$29 billion over 3 years, of which US$20 billion would 
be provided by the commercial banks. 
18. Mexico's spread was 0.81 % for both the rescheduled principal and new money. The amortization periods 
were 20 and 12 years, respectively. N o commissions were charged. The rescheduling covered maturities over the 
period 1985-1990. 
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19. For example, U.S . banks experienced a second-quarter loss of US$11 billion due to the adding of US$21 
billion to loan loss reserves for developing country debt. (Skidmore 1987). 
20. Data on the loan loss reserves of commercial banks can be found in ECLAC (1990a). 
21. A full analysis of the Brady Plan is found in ECLAC (1990a). 
22. For an analysis of the debt reduction agreement, see ECLAC (1990c). 
23. A description of the agreements can be found in ECLAC (1990b). 
24. That is, well above 2. This conventional criterion of high indebtedness has emerged based on the rationale 
that, with interest rates at about 8%-10%, such a level of indebtedness would only absorb 16%-20% of exports for 
the payment of interest and allow the debt-service ratio to be around 24%-30%. 
25. This criterion is equivalent to Simonsen's "weak solvency test", i .e . , that the interest rate does not exceed 
the rate of growth of exports (Simonsen, 1985). 
26. The IMF concurred, at the time, with this stance. Nevertheless, given the meager amount of its resources 
relative to the new international financial scene, this concurrence was more conceptual than practical. 
27. See ECLAC, (1990b; Table 18). 
28. To say nothing of Bolivia, in which interest payments on the public debt already committed two thirds of 
public revenues. 
29. The assumption of private external debt, which was forced on the countries by the creditor cartel, 
represented an addition to interest payments by the public sector that may have amounted to 40% in Argentina, 
Chile and Venezuela and to around 20% in Ecuador, Mexico and Uruguay (see ECLAC, 1989; chap. X). 
30. In part, the rise in the proportion of public resources absorbed by interest payments on the external debt 
was brought on by the real devaluations required by external adjustment. If those real devaluations had not taken 
place, fiscal resources (in national currency) required to pay interest on the external public debt would have been 
30% less in Chile, Mexico and Uruguay; more than 20% less in Argentina and Ecuador; and around 10% less than 
the actual amounts in Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela (ECLAC, 1989; chap. X). 
31. The effects of the debt reduction itself were extremely modest. See ECLAC (1990c). 
32. A situation that in many cases has been significantly aggravated, as already noted, by the assumption of 
private debt by the public sector. The absorption of debt was largely forced upon the governments by their 
creditors. Since most of these obligations were originally unguaranteed, there clearly was little technical justification 
for the pressure placed on debtor governments to assume bad debts ex post and without compensation. 
33. It should be remembered, however, that in the year prior to falling into a de facto moratorium with most 
of its creditors, Cuba initiated a vocal campaign against the international debt strategy, affirming that the debt was 
unpayable and should therefore be forgiven. But interestingly, the country's arguments were carefully directed at 
the region's debt as a whole rather than the Cuban situation as such. Indeed, during the campaign Cuba was 
punctually serving its obligations (Castro 1985). 
34. The moratorium also might have been a direct provocation of U.S . Treasury Secretary Baker, who, a few 
weeks earlier, had intervened in Brazil's favor to resolve a serious conflict between the country and the Paris Club. 
For the details, see de Freitas (1992). 
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35. The challenge over the travel expenses would seem technically justified since the debt problem arose not 
just out of overborrowing, but also overlending. 
36. The 1987 moratorium was announced after the Cruzado Plan had clearly collapsed. 
37. Peru did this because it found that private sector debt service had become a vehicle for flight capital 
(Figueroa, 1992). 
38. A delay of six months or more is considered serious. As mentioned earlier, Honduras eliminated most of 
its arrears in a consultative group operation in 1990. Peru and Nicaragua arrived at settlements with their 
multilateral creditors in 1991. 
39. For a good summary of some of the perceived threats from default see Cline (1984). 
40. For a technical discussion of the set-off, see Biggs (1992). 
41. In the rescheduling agreements the banks frequently committed themselves to keeping open a specified 
amount of short term credit. 
42. Indeed, after the announcement of the 1987 moratorium there was open criticism in certain news media 
and in professional circles. 
43. Venezuela's turnaround is very recent. It did not become a model adjuster until 1989. Its determined 
internal efforts were moreover greatly aided by a rise in the price of petroleum and an opportunity to increase export 
volume on account of a breakdown in OPEC's quota system during the Gulf War. Venezuela also did not play 
entirely by the conventional rules of the game in the debt negotiations, e .g. , it had a moratorium on amortization 
payments in 1982-1983 and substantial interest arrears during part of the period 1989/1990. 
44. Stallings (1990) suggests that the authoritative nature of the regimes may have been an important factor in 
their successful adjustment. 
45. Mention should be made of some of the additional factors in play here. In Costa Rica, its important 
geopolitical position in Central America meant that the country received an average of $175 million per annum in 
official grants. This may help to explain the mild character of its credit moratorium. Meanwhile, Bolivia also 
benefitted from official transfers —especially in 1987-1988, when they averaged $140 millon per annum— and 
considerable repatriation of resident capital in the first three years of Paz Estenssoro's economic program. Peru's 
overall transfer displays an adverse shift in 1989 due to a bulge in the flight of capital which corresponded to a 
sharp reverse in expectations about the country's economic program. The adverse trend in Argentina in 1989 was 
also due to the collapse of its economic program and expectations in April of that year. 
46. For a detailed legal analysis see Biggs (1992). 
47. Nevertheless, in delicate legal matters like this there always is the potential threat of escalating problems. 
48. Note that the banks did not include arrears in the debt reduction exercise; they were rescheduled on less 
favorable terms. See ECLAC (1990b and 1990c). 
49. This is because private investors, among other things, must negotiate a queue for foreign exchange and 
for public payments as well as confront undue uncertainty over key variables such as the exchange rate, interest 
rates, foreign credit lines, etc. 
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50. Bolivia showed sensitivity to the U .S . ' s concern about drug traffic. Argentina's privatizations —in which 
large banks have shown an interest— and cooperation with the allies in the Gulf War have probably helped to reduce 
tensions around that country's moratorium. 
51. For an analysis of the shortcomings of the debt strategy and proposals to overcome them, see ECLAC 
(1990a). 
52. An analysis of the underfunding problem is in ECLAC (1990a). Essentially, underfunding in Brady's 
voluntary system leads to modest debt reduction. Hence, in situations of underfunding, temporary arrears may be 
a surer, albeit less efficient, route to financing IMF adjustment programs. 

T A B L E S 

T a b l e 1 
LATIN AMERICA; INTEREST ARREARS ON THE EXTERNAL DEBT" 
(Millions of dollars) 
YEARS 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Total 129 247 916 1 893 -489 791 4 861 328 8 167 9 120 
OIL 
EXPORTERS 12 47 114 419 536 713 1 280 668 766 881 
Bolivia 12 39 26 95 137 56 48 -306 -58 -44 
Colombia 0 0 0 0 5 -5 2 -1 2 25 Ecuador 0 0 0 0 9 4 446 341 271 460 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Peru 0 8 88 324 384 657 782 635 548 446 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 -1 3 -6 
MOM OIL 
EXPORTERS 28 29 919 1 270 -1 118 -212 2 912 -1 034 6 552 7 542 
Argentina 0 0 837 1 237 -1 297 -291 -135 1 777 3 405 1 699 
Brazil 28 29 74 27 166 54 3 033 -2 838 3 162 5 803 
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Paraguay 0 0 8 6 13 25 14 27 -15 40 
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CENTRÄL 
R SUfB* EJ TfPR 
ÄUD THE 
CARIBBEAN 89 171 -117 204 93 290 669 694 849 697 
Costa Rica 84 145 -214 51 -53 67 140 60 105 -305 
Dominican 
Republic 3 6 4 60 -41 27 89 59 75 224 
El Salvador 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 4 14 -17 
Guatemala 0 0 0 10 30 19 24 13 21 81 
Haiti 0 0 0 9 2 -1 1 5 -1 8 
Honduras 2 2 7 19 14 19 44 28 29 -52 
Nicaragua 0 18 85 55 139 158 354 229 304 354 
Panama 0 0 1 0 0 -1 16 295 302 404 
Source? World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1990-1991, Washington, D. C. a: Annual accumulation. 
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T a b l e 12 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ACCUMULATED ARREARS 
AS A PERCENT OF ACCUMULATED DEBT3 
(1981=base year) 
Percentages 
YEARS 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
TOTAL 1 1 3 2 2 5 6 12 20 
OIL 
EXPORTERS — — 1 2 3 4 6 7 9 
Bolivia 24 8 18 24 19 20 6 5 -1 
Colombia 0 0 0 -0 - - - -
Ecuador 0 0 0 1 1 14 24 28 36 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru 1 4 13 19 28 33 44 50 52 
Venezuela 0 0 0 — — — — — 0 
NON OIL 
EXPORTERS — 3 5 2 1 5 4 16 31 
Argentina 0 6 14 4 2 1 8 18 29 
Brazil - 1 1 1 1 8 2 15 39 
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Paraguay 0 2 3 3 5 5 7 6 13 
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CENTRAL AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN 8 1 4 4 6 10 15 20 24 
Costa Rica 74 -7 -2 -6 _ 9 15 23 
Dominican Republic 2 1 8 2 4 8 12 15 26 
El Salvador 0 0 0 - - 1 1 2 1 
Guatemala 0 0 1 3 4 6 8 10 15 
Haiti 0 0 7 6 4 3 5 5 6 
Honduras 1 2 5 5 6 7 9 11 6 
Nicaragua 4 8 7 11 12 19 22 25 28 
Panama 0 — — 0 1 20 41 65 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables 1989-1990; 1990-1991, Washington, D. C. 
a: Long term debt. 
(-) = Not significant. 
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T a b l e 12 
LATIN AMERICAS DEBT/EXPORT COEFFICIENTS2 
(Percentages) 
Countries 1979 1982 1986 1990 
Group I 
Argentina 207 475 610 499 
Bolivia 227 327 530 389 
Brazil 353 418 460 351 
Costa Rica 213 285 281 155 
Ecuador 147 198 345 363 
Peru 228 281 429 416 
Group II 
Colombia 115 232 233 209 
Chile 184 370 405 167 
Mexico 262 337 459 258 
Uruguay 141 276 349 338 
Venezuela 154 183 347 161 
Sources CEPAL, Economic Development Division. 
Total external debt. 
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T a b l e 12 
LATIN AMERICA: PUBLIC DEBT AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT 
(Percentages) 
1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Group I 
Argentina 37. 5 36. 4 55. 4 
Bolivia 80. 8 85. 2 80. 0 Brazil 57. 5 55. 7 60. 9 
Costa Rica 61. 8 65. 6 75. 1 
Ecuador 55. 0 50. 4 73. 0 
Peru 61. 9 56. 6 68. 4 
Group II 
Colombia 58. 9 58. 1 60. 2 
Chile 38. 9 30. 3 36. 8 
Mexico 59. 1 59. 9 71. 8 
Uruguay 67. 9 64. 2 76. 2 
Venezuela 36. 1 38. 7 38. 7 
54.6 73.3 78.1 84. 2 80.9 79.4 78.1 73.1 73.0 79. 2 81.3 82.7 67.2 70.6 74.9 74. 0 77. 7 75.7 79.7 80.2 79.0 78. 4 78.0 77.9 79.0 82.7 88.5 85. 8 84.0 83.3 70.3 72.4 70.2 68. 3 65.8 63.7 
64.2 67.2 79.3 81. 3 81.5 82.9 53.8 63.3 69.5 72. 3 69.9 59.5 73.5 75.1 75.2 77. 1 80.0 79.7 77.3 68.8 74.1 72. 5 77.2 79.1 50.9 50.2 73.1 71. 2 71.4 76.5 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1990-1991, Washington D. C., 1990. 
T a b l e 11 
LATIN AMERICA: RATIO OF INTEREST PAID OR ACCRUED ON PUBLIC FOREIGN DEBT 
AND CURRENT PUBLIC REVENUES® 
(Percentages) 
Countries Interest 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Group I 
Argentina Paid 3.0 2.3 2.3 4.1 10.3 11.4 12.8 20.5 15.2 16.3 
Accrued 3.0 2.3 2.3 4.1 10.3 16.6 18.8 15.1 13.9 15.6 • • o Bolivia Paid • • • 20.2 26.2 50.1 79.0 41.5 16.5 7.3 12.1 0 « « 
Accrued • • • 20.2 26.2 63.6 82.9 59.8 39.2 13.5 20.0 
Brazil Paid • • » 6.6 7.5 8.8 11.2 11.6 10.9 6.7 7.0 12.1 
Accrued • • • 6.6 7.5 8.8 11.2 11.6 10.9 6.7 10.9 9.2 Costa Rica Paid • • • 9.8 14.2 12.0 47.8 16.8 24.0 12.3 7.8 
Accrued • • • 9.8 14.2 42.2 30.5 20.6 20.1 17.2 21.5 o • • 
Ecuador Paid 8.3 9.6 12.7 17.5 12.9 26.7 18.4 21.3 10.3 • • • 
Accrued 8.3 9.6 12.7 17.5 12.9 26.7 18.4 21.3 28.6 • a « Peru Paid • • • 13.3 12.5 13.0 20.5 9.1 8.2 5.9 5.2 2.5 3.0 
Accrued 13.3 12.5 13.0 20.5 23.1 22.4 16.2 12.6 19.0 22.7 • • • Grupo II 
Colombia Paid 3.6 3.7 4.3 6.7 7.8 8.0 6.4 11.3 10.9 13.4 12.7 13.7 
Chile Paid 5.8 4.8 4.8 4.9 6.9 7.7 13.9 16.3 19.4 15.7 • « • • e • 
Mexico Paid • • • . • • 8.5 9.3 16.8 18.6 16.9 18.0 21.7 19.2 16.5 14.4 Uruguay Paid 4.4 3.8 4.1 3.5 5.1 13.0 21.6 20.4 12.8 11.8 • o • • e e 
Venezuela Paid • « • • • • 5.7 5.4 7.3 9.1 6.9 7.8 12.4 12.6 o s o o o • 
Source; CEPAL, Economic Development Division. 
*: Includes total revenues of the general government plus operating surplus (or deficit) of public enterprises. 
(...) = Unavailable. 
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T a b l e 12 
LATIN AMERICA: ROLLOVER RATIOS ON TOTAL FOREIGN DEBT SERVICE8 
(Percentages) 
Countries 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Group I 
Argentina 74 55 176 193 343 104 150 168 246 
Bolivia 99 93 208 109 477 624 200 190 • • • 135 
Brazil 119 100 145 120 116 158 167 176 • • « • • • 
Costa Rica 95 146 231 48 171 102 216 541 330 410 
Ecuador 86 79 150 78 135 124 103 92 168 104 
Peru 134 137 97 98 185 285 498 439 707 856 
Group II 
Colombia 83 77 92 100 96 98 221 131 Chile 73 74 136 197 68 133 141 165 178 282 
Mexico 98 90 98 114 180 170 170 182 396 816 
Uruguay 118 77 69 67 382 997 377 256 531 505 
Venezuela 127 194 155 281 1296 1536 1954 699 778 593 
Source: CEPAL, Economic Development Division. 
" Rollover ratio is debt service (interest and amortization, excluding short-
term) divided by disbursements (excluding short-term) of new loans. 
(...) = Unavailable 
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T a b l e 12 
LATIN AMERICA; INTERNATIONAL RESERVES" IN RELATION 
TO IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
(Numbers of months of imports) 
Countries 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Group I 
Argentina 12.0 12.8 6.2 3.4 4.6 2.4 2.5 7.4 5.0 2.5 5.5 2.8 
Bolivia 2.2 1.9 1.5 1.0 2.6 2.6 4.6 3.4 2.3 1.3 1.7 3.2 
Brazil 8.6 5.0 2.5 2.9 1.9 2.7 7.8 7.5 3.8 3.9 4.2 3.7 
Costa Rica 1.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 2.6 3.3 3.9 4.8 4.7 3.6 4.7 4.3 
Ecuador 3.5 3.3 4.2 2.4 1.3 4.2 3.6 4.0 3.5 2.2 2.2 2.9 
Peru 2.3 7.3 6.0 2.9 3.4 4.4 6.5 7.9 4.5 1.7 1.5 2.9 
Grupo II 
Colombia 8.3 11.8 10.6 9.5 6.9 4.0 3.1 3.8 6.4 6.5 6.1 6.4 
Chile 3.6 4.5 5.3 4.7 4.3 6.0 6.2 7.5 6.4 5.5 5.7 4.3 
Mexico 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.5 0.5 3.7 5.4 3.2 4.2 8.7 2.5 2.4 
Uruguay 4.4 2.6 2.1 2.5 0.9 2.1 1.5 2.0 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.0 
Venezuela 4.8 6.2 5.2 5.7 4.0 10.1 10.7 12.7 7.7 6.6 2.6 5.3 
Source: CEPAL, Economic Development Division. 
" Total reserves minus gold. 
Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA: RATIO OF TOTAL IMPORTS TO TOTAL EXPORTS 
(Percentages) 
Countries 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Argentina 66 96 132 107 71 63 62 53 77 94 66 54 
Bolivia 135 131 81 114 79 86 81 98 126 140 109 90 
Brazil 121 130 127 107 113 83 61 61 76 69 55 64 
Costa Rica 126 138 138 111 93 101 98 104 96 112 105 113 
Ecuador 156 110 102 109 109 69 70 66 86 109 83 80 
Peru 86 61 86 122 118 99 79 74 112 126 114 75 
Chile 111 113 118 165 108 88 104 88 86 87 80 91 
Colombia 87 86 102 140 151 152 103 114 78 89 96 92 
Mexico 106 110 109 116 76 47 53 67 75 62 86 94 
Uruguay- 106 126 140 123 103 85 83 82 79 91 82 75 
Venezuela 155 95 76 82 112 57 60 62 100 96 127 66 
Source: CEPAL, Economic Development Division. 
T a b l e 11 
LATIN AMERICA: RATIO OF PUBLIC EXTERNAL DEBT" TO CURRENT PUBLIC REVENUESb 
(Percentages) 
Countries 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Argentina 41 34 27 41 125 196 164 223 195 245 
Bolivia 269 424 785 1398 736 580 550 726 
Brazil 64 66 76 125 147 140 114 120 107 
Costa Rica 128 269 365 299 239 254 227 232 . . . 
Ecuador 104 110 126 121 193 217 186 264 359 
Peru 151 142 164 262 255 314 303 310 451 652 
Colombia 60 55 63 83 82 106 91 141 151 166 155 160 
Chile 87 64 47 45 66 96 162 210 230 213 . . . 
Mexico 74 83 140 188 160 174 267 257 201 155 
Uruguay 57 50 38 38 55 156 192 194 148 136 . . . 
Venezuela • • • • • 0 49 50 55 75 84 96 181 196 O 0 « 
Source: CEPAL, Economic Development Division. 
a: Public and publicly guaranteed debt: World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1990-1991, 
Washington D.C., 1990. 
b: Includes total revenues of the general government plus operating surplus (or deficit) of public 
enterprises. 
(...) = Unavailable. 
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T a b l e 12 
RATIO OF INTEREST ACCRUED ON PUBLIC FOREIGN DEBT AND DEFICIT 
OF NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
(Percentages) 
Countries 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Group I 
Argentina 8 7 13 22 33 64 79 54 ... 
Bolivia 88 94 91 52 21 206 -78 125 ... 
Brazil 136 54 48 67 85 68 69 63 44 
Costa Rica 31 356 309 -944 -147 -194 -322 -218 
Ecuador 34 39 61 63 600 -2 891 159 156 ... 
Peru 67 32 29 33 64 168 49 23 23 
Group II 
Colombia 33 21 23 19 20 59 848 155 125 
Chile -34 -397 59 79 114 224 494 -2 037 ... 
Mexico 27 14 24 59 60 53 33 31 41 
Uruguay -108 59 13 90 120 236 772 496 ... 




Source: CEPAL, Economic Development Division. 
Note: (-) = Surplus; (...) = Unavailable 
T a b l e 11 
LATIN AMERICA? ROLLOVER RATIO ON PUBLIC FOREIGN DEBT SERVICE" 
(Percentages) 
Countries 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Argentina 69 47 70 113 49 134 684 94 186 152 322 611 
Bolivia 67 81 66 75 139 197 184 282 62 84 86 83 
Brazil 47 68 98 91 95 93 81 282 220 440 189 440 
Costa Rica 81 66 48 64 196 87 158 123 236 606 325 256 
Ecuador 39 87 57 59 400 197 120 148 86 156 151 162 
Peru 90 83 121 126 72 57 74 163 163 131 225 149 
Colombia 131 65 52 51 71 67 62 77 71 194 124 140 
Chile 83 93 160 152 79 49 76 90 151 185 123 247 
Mexico 74 95 86 61 79 159 220 269 264 125 220 331 
Uruguay 103 66 74 62 52 61 217 185 163 152 181 146 
Venezuela 30 40 103 113 140 111 363 727 714 556 186 207 
Source? Calculated from World Bank, World Debt Tables 1990-1991, Washington D.C., 1990 y CEPAL 
estimates. 
"? Rollover ratio is debt service (accrued interest and amortization) on public debt divided by 
disbursements to the public sector (excluding short-term). 
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T a b l e 12 
LATIN AMERICA: RATIO OF NET FOREIGN TRANSFER OF RESOURCES TO THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR* TO CURRENT PUBLIC REVENUESb 
(Percentages) 
Before the crisis During the crisis 
Countries Period Yearly average Period Yearly average 
Argentina 80-82 7 83-87 -7 








Costa Rica 80-82 12 83-87 -11 




















Uruguay 80-83 6 84-87 -11 
Venezuela 80-83 -2 84-87 -14 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data and data from the 
World Bank. 
a: Interest and amortization payments by the public sector minus 
disbursements to the public sector. 
b: Includes total revenues of the general government plus operating 
surplus (or deficit) of public enterprises. 
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Table 14 
LATIN AMERICA AMD THE CARIBBEAN: PERIODS OF MORATORIUM 








Non-oi l-ejiporting cmnitries 
Argentina it&lr-tfStiftrQiitr irtcCfhtitclcttiiitlfefttlfCt 
Brazil ftââââ&ftâftftftftft ******** 
Paraguay 
Costa Rica ***** ******** ifûôftftftftiiliôiïiïïiéiMrificÈéftft^ iiliftfrTiiili 
Cuba 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Dominican 









* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
<><><><><><><><><><><><><> 
Source: CEPAL. on the basis of official data. 
Symbols: 
= Consnercial banks 
******** = Paris Club creditors 
<><><> = Multilateral creditors 
= Incomplete information 
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T a b l e 14 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ECONOMIC PERFOMANCE 
OF THE PROBLEM DEBTORS 
Growth Sustained Sporadic or not significant 
Inflation Moratorium Non-moratorium Moratorium Non-moratorium 
Relative CRI(1986-90) CHI(1984-90) BOL(1986-90) CHI(1982-83) 
price PAR(1987-90) MEX(1989-90) CUBA(1986-90) 
stability HON(1982-90) 
CRI(1982-85) 
Severe GUAT(1987-90) ARG(1983-84) MEX(1982-88) 
or sharply ARG(1988-90) VEN(1982-90)a 











Source; CEPAL, Economic Development Division. 
a: There were indications that in the coming years this country could join 
Chile and Mexico in the upper left-hand box. 
Table 15 
SIX MORATORIUM COUNTRIES: NET TRANSFER OF RESOURCES8 
(Millions of dol lars) 
Countries 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988c/ 1989b/ 1990b/ 1991b/ 
Argentina 
Total -3 033 -5 429 -3 050 -3 321 -2 448 -2 162 -1 654 -6 465 -4 615 -200 
Credit -4 460 -5 880 -3 583 -2 778 -2 477 -1 271 -1 126 -6 534 
Boiivia 
Total -182 -117 -55 66 274 201 120 41 105 295 
Credit -237 - 200 - 80 - 273 86 - 73 - 82 - 24 
BraziI 
Total -2 381 -6 060 -6 133 -11 414 -9 056 -6 747 -14 545 -11 854 -7 044 -8 550 
Credit -2 399 -5 110 -6 559 -10 328 -7 048 -5 034 -14 423 
Costa Rica 
Total 24 39 -109 81 11 184 285 333 188 315 
Credit -176 -145 -366 -268 -241 -185 -237 -138 
Ecuador 
Total 2 -561 -777 -956 -469 253 -353 -306 -435 -415 
Credit 248 -991 -627 -1 041 583 895 -152 -294 
Peru 
Total 658 -72 -535 -816 113 275 480 -422 365 1 790 
Credit 962 -316 15 -580 -71 159 446 -211 
Source: CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latin American and The Caribbean 1989, Santiago de Chile, 1990. 
a: Total transfer i s net capital flows less net factor payments. Credit transfer i s net medium, long and short term loans less interest 
payments. 
b: Preliminary. 
( — > : not avai lable 






LATIN AMERICA? INTEREST ARREARS WITH COMMERCIAL BANKS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Countries 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Total 1 244 3 453 2 228 1 222 1 518 5 878 5 417 13 557 20 947 
Oil 
exporters 51 145 414 743 1 204 2 042 2 986 3 944 4 796 
Bolivia 51 77 120 213 260 317 236 193 156 
Colombia - - 64 - - - - - -
Ecuador - - - - - 368 804 1 243 1 544 
Mexico - - - - - - - - -
Peru - 68 294 466 944 1 357 1 946 2 508 3 096 
Venezuela — — — — — — — 
Non-oil 
exporters 937 3 300 1 743 442 260 3 667 1 965 8 702 15 265 
Argentina 937 968 1 743 442 257 228 1 949 5 216 6 825 
Brazil - 2 340 - - - 3 430 - 3 454 8 376 
Chile - - - - - - - - -
Paraguay - - - - 3 9 16 32 66 
Uruguay — — — — — — — — — 
Central America 
and 
the Caribbean 256 — 71 37 54 169 466 911 866 
Costa Rica 242 - 45 1 54 154 248 372 -
Dominican 
Republic 14 - 26 36 - - - 67 158 
El Salvador e e e e • e ... ... ... « , 
Guatemala • • « « • • ... ... ... e e • 
Hiti • e o e e e ... ... ... « » • 
Honduras • « • e o e ... ... ... e • • 
Nicaragua • « . e e e ... ... ... e • • 
Panama e o e ... » e o 15 218 472 728 
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